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1 Introduction
In the last decades several cartels have been dismantled in various jurisdictions ei-
ther because some of their members have blown the whistle to antitrust authorities1
(henceforth AAs) or because AAsown investigations have exposed incriminat-
ing hard evidence.2 Moreover, numerous cartels have been prosecuted based on
indirect evidence, as the AAs investigations failed to disclose hard evidence.3
Intuitively the cartels whose members keep hard evidence have a higher prob-
ability of detection and, hence, conviction by an AA. For instance, if an AA in-
stigates a dawn raid in a market whereby it detects cogent and irrefutable incrim-
inating hard evidence (i.e. meetings notes/memos/minutes, emails, videos, voice
recordings, scoresheetstracking a cartels members compliance etc.), it can di-
rectly and speedily convict the cartel. On the other hand, if the AAs investigations
are not fruitful in tracing hard evidence then presumably more e¤ort is required
to substantiate the existence of the cartel.
A question that logically arises is why collusive rms do not destroy the hard
evidence of their illegal communication to curtail the likelihood of detection by
AAs. A reasonable speculation is that rms keep hard evidence to exchange it
with a ne discount on the basis of a leniency program (henceforth LP). How-
ever, there are several instances in case law where AAs investigations conrmed
that rms keep hard self-incriminating evidence even when LPs are not part of the
antitrust enforcement policy. This suggests that the existence of a LP may not
be the exclusive motive justifying rmsdecision to keep hard evidence. Never-
theless, the introduction of a LP, it could sensibly be argued, inuences collusive
rmsdecisions to keep or destroy the hard evidence. Pertinent to this is also the
fact that those rms that keep hard evidence do not necessarily exchange it with
lenient treatment. The relevant case law illustrates several cases where the AAs
investigations are fruitful in detecting and exposing hard evidence in rms hands.
1See for instance the following cases: Case COMP/E-1/36 604 - Citric acid, 5/12/2001.
Case COMP/E-1/37.152  Plasterboard, 27/11/2002. Case COMP/E-1/38.069 - Copper
plumbing tubes, 3/9/2004. Case COMP/C.38.281/B.2  Raw tobacco Italy, 20/10/2005.
Case COMP/F/38.899  Gas insulated switchgear, 24/1/2007. Case COMP/E-1/38.823 -
PO/Elevators and escalators, 21/2/2007. Case COMP/38.628 - Nitrile butadiene rubber,
23/1/2008. Case COMP/38511 DRAMs, 19/5/2010.
2See for instance the following cases: Case IV/31.865 - PVC, 27/7/1994. COMP/C-
38.279 - French beef, 2/4/2003. COMP/38.432 - Professional videotapes, 20/11/2007.
COMP/39165 - Flat glass, 28/11/2007. COMP/38.543 - International removal services,
11/3/2008. COMP/39125 - Car glass, 12/11/2008.
3See for instance the following cases: Cases 89/85, 105/85, 114/85, 116-117/85, 125-129/85
- A. Ahlström Oy v. Commission, 27//9/1988. Case IV/34.621, 35.059/F-3 - Irish Sugar,
24/5/1997. Case IV/33.133 - Solvay ICI, 19/12/1990. COMP/E-1/36.756 - Sodium gluconate
II, 29/9/2004. COMP/B-2/37.666 - Dutch beer market, 18/4/2007.
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The above discussion brings into the surface several interesting questions in
relation to the apparently puzzling behavior of collusive rms. The most critical
questions pertain to the factors that inuence rmsdecisions to keep or destroy
the hard incriminating evidence, the impact of a LP on the said decisions, and the
underlying incentives of rms to keep nevertheless nor report the hard evidence.
The existing literature remains silent to these puzzling questions as its main
focus is on the e¤ects of LPs on cartel formation (deterrence) and/or cartel sus-
tainability (desistance).4 The major shortcoming of the existing studies relates to
the assumption that rms axiomatically keep the hard evidence that is generated
by the cartel. In other words, the literature typically assumes that collusive rms
have no option to destroy the hard incriminating evidence.
One notable exception to the literature is Aubert et al. [2006], whose study pro-
vides some plausible explanations that rationalize rmsdecision to keep rather
than destroying the hard evidence. One of those contends that rms may keep
evidence in order to pay a lower ne in case of detection by the AA. An alternative
one is that rms may use the hard evidence as a disciplining device to mitigate
rmsincentives to develop opportunistic behavior.5 A limitation of Aubert et al.s
[2006] analysis is, however, the assumption that the AA can o¤er positive rewards
to self-reporting rms. Although this assumption leads to appealing and desirable
theoretical results6, it has been criticized in the literature primarily because it
is politically infeasible and ethically immoral to reward wrongdoers.7 More im-
portantly their study cannot answer two crucial questions: why rms keep hard
evidence in the absence of a LP, and in which respect, if any, does the introduc-
tion of a LP, as part of the enforcement policy, a¤ects rmsincentives to keep or
destroy the hard evidence.
Another paper that explores rmsincentives to destroy (partially or fully) or
even to create additional evidence is Silbye [2010]. This paper highlights the trade-
o¤ associated with rmsdecisions to keep or destroy the hard evidence. On the
one hand more evidence qualies a self-reporting rm with a higher ne discount
(ne discount is positively related with the quantity of evidence submitted). More
evidence on the other hand implies a higher probability of detection and conviction
4The existing literature provides answers, among others, as to the optimal level of ne dis-
count that should be o¤ered to self-reporting rms, the number of rms that should be eligible
for obtaining leniency and the stage at which leniency should be o¤ered (before or after the com-
mencement of AAs investigation in the market). See Motta and Polo [2003], Spagnolo [2004],
Motchenkova [2004] and Harrington [2008]. For a recent literature review see Spagnolo [2008].
5A similar argument is put forward by Buccirossi and Spagnolo [2006]. These authors maintain
that rms can use the hard evidence as a credible threat towards deviations from the collusive
agreement.
6See Spagnolo [2004].
7For a discussion of the potential costs of rewarding wrongdoers see Aubert et al. [2006] and
Spagnolo [2008].
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by the AA, as it is easier for the AA to unravel the cartel if more evidence exists.
Silbye [2010] concludes that the option to destroy the hard evidence does not a¤ect
the design of the LP.
To tackle some of the open questions in the relevant literature we develop a
model wherein rmsdecision to keep or destroy the hard evidence is, as in Aubert
et al. [2006], endogenous. A key assumption in our model is that a cartels sus-
tainability (administration and detection of defections) crucially depends on hard
evidence.8 Specically we assume that if at least one cartel member destroys the
hard evidence, the cartel may, with some probability, collapse, and thus rms are
deprived of future collusive prots. The underlying reasoning for this assumption
is that hard evidence allows more e¤ective implementation and monitoring of the
terms of the collusive agreement. We call this e¤ect the cartel collapse e¤ect of
hard evidence (henceforth the CCE). Essentially this e¤ect rationalize rms
decision to keep hard evidence even in absence of a LP.
The decision to keep hard evidence does not, however, come without a cost for
the cartel. In accordance with Silbye [2010] we assume that the probability of cartel
detection is higher when rms keep hard evidence.9 If the AAs investigation in the
market exposes hard evidence, then the prosecution of the cartel is facilitated and
thus the AA does not need to undertake additional e¤ort to validate or further
substantiate its case against the cartel. We call this e¤ect the cartel detection
e¤ect of hard evidence (henceforth the CDE). Intuitively this e¤ect increases
the expected cost of the cartel by increasing the expected ne.
Both e¤ects, the CCE and the CDE, cause a contraction to the net expected
collusive prots. On the one hand, when rms destroy the hard evidence cartels
coordination becomes less e¤ective (the cartel collapse with a positive probability)
and the gross expected collusive prots decrease. On the other hand, when rms
keep the hard evidence the probability of cartel detection is higher, thus the ex-
pected cost of the cartel increase. The strength of the two e¤ects will reveal the
8It is worth noting that in Aubert et al. [2006] a cartels sustainability is not inuenced
directly by the existence of hard evidence. A cartel, in their model, may collapse if a rms
drastic innovation is successful, as the successful rm would prefer to compete forever rather
than to collude. Within this setup hard evidence may operate as a mechanism to vitiate rms
incentives to defect from the cartel. Essentially, by threatening to denounce the cartel in case
of defection from the collusive agreement, the deviant rms incentive compatibility constraint
tightens, as it has to pay the full ne to the AA. Contrarily, in our model the existence of hard
evidence directly a¤ects cartels sustainability by ebableing rms to monitor and react to their
collaboratorsmarket conduct.
9Aubert et al. [2006] also make this assumption. However, contrary to Aubert et al. [2006]
we assume that a cartel can be detected even in absence of hard evidence, based solely on
indirect evidence. In our view, this is a more realistic assumption. As already remarked, in real
world there are cases where AAs in various jurisdictions have convicted rms for collusion based
exclusively on indirect evidence.
4
conditions under which collusive rms choose to keep or destroy the hard evidence
even when the antitrust enforcement policy does not encompass a LP.
In our model the introduction of a LP o¤ers to collusive rms an opportunity to
exploit the LP. In particular, rms may keep the hard evidence and subsequently
exchange it with a reduced ne within the framework of a LP.10 We call this e¤ect
the cartel amnesty e¤ect of hard evidence (henceforth the CAE). This e¤ect
causes a reduction to the expected cost associated with rmsdecision to keep
hard evidence. Therefore, collusive rms may choose to keep the hard evidence
not only to evade the costly breakdown of the cartel but also to exploit the LP.
The interplay of the three e¤ects, CCE, CDE and CAE, allows us to explore the
impact of a LP on rmsdecisions to keep or destroy hard evidence. Moreover,
the introduction of a LP allows the investigation of the conditions under which
collusive rms keep hard evidence without reporting it to the AA.
The main conclusions of our study is that rms are more likely to keep hard
evidence when: i) the cartels sustainability is more sensitive to hard evidence or
ii) the probability of cartel detection is less depended on hard evidence or iii)
the collusive prots-ne ratio is high. Moreover, we show that the introduction of
a LP reinforces rmsincentives to keep hard evidence. Finally, we demonstrate
that rms may keep hard evidence without reporting it to the AA if the cartels
sustainability is very sensitive to hard evidence and the (aggregate) probability of
cartel detection is su¢ ciently low.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the model. Section 3
presents the baseline model without LP. The extended model with LP is presented
in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2 Outline of the model
Similar to Motta and Polo [2003] we consider two rms playing an innitely re-
peated game in the presence of an AA which enforces antitrust law. This is a
signicant di¤erence to Aubert et al. [2006] who study a dynamic non-repeated
game. Essentially these authors assume that the hard evidence is indelible so that
rms can use it in any future period, as long as the cartel has not been detected.
On the contrary, we assume that there is full information decay after the end of
each period. This could be for example the case when the hard evidence consists
of scoresheets tracking cartel members compliance to the individual terms of
the agreement. After the end of each period this evidence has no value to rms
as it refers only to the past. The repeated structure could also be justied on
the ground that the collusive agreement has limited time frame due to changing
10This contrasts with Aubert et al. [2006] who show that rms may keep hard evidence in
order to discipline defections from the cartel.
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market (i.e. demand) or policy conditions (i.e. ne). For instance, rms may shift
to other markets which guarantee more lucrative opportunities for trade.
To simplify our analysis we assume markets where cartel formation is always
protable for rms. We call a market with this feature a pro-collusive market.11
Our goal is not to show the deterrence or desistance e¤ects of LPs but to investigate
the e¤ects of the introduction of such programs on rms incentives to keep or
destroy the hard evidence and their incentives to reveal or not that evidence to
the AA.
We assume that collusion generates and leaves symmetric hard incriminating
evidence. In addition, we assume that the existence of a cartel cannot be observed
by the AA unless the latter launches an investigation in the market. The AAs
investigation is successful only with some probability. This probability crucially
depends on whether hard evidence exists. Destroying the hard evidence does not
necessarily imply that rms will escape unscathed by the AAs investigations. The
cartel can be detected and successfully prosecuted based exclusively on indirect
evidence, that is, evidence of facts and circumstances supporting an inference of a
cartel.12 We call this probability of cartel detection, which is independent of hard
evidence, the base probability of detection and we denote it by p.
If the two collusive rms decide to keep the hard evidence, the probability of
detection increases to p+p. Parameterp represents the incremental probability
of cartel detection when both rms choose to keep rather than destroy the hard
evidence. Essentially this parameter reects the quality of hard evidence or the
AAs e¢ cacy in prosecuting cartels when its investigations expose hard evidence.
The better the quality of hard evidence is or the more e¤ective the AA is in
assessing the hard evidence detected, the higher the incremental probability of
detection would be. We assume that p is exogenous. If only one rm chooses
to keep hard evidence, the additional probability of detection decreases to p
2
.13
The underlying reasoning is that the AA may in that case need to investigate the
market more in order to corroborate the quality of the reported evidence. In the
extreme case where the AAs competency in detecting cartels is not inuenced by
the existence of hard evidence or the quality of the hard evidence is unreliable so
that the AA cannot rely on it to prosecute the cartel, then p = 0.
To sum up, when both rms destroy the hard evidence the probability of de-
tection is p 2 [0; 1 p], when both rms keep the hard evidence the probability
11Technically the existence of a pro-collusive market is guaranteed by Assumptions 3 and 4,
i.e.   12 and F  1, respectively, of our paper.
12This evidence could include for example market data on prices or sudden change in rms
conduct not justied otherwise by the market conditions.
13A similar assumption is made by Aubert et al. [2006]. However, these authors, contrary
to this paper, assume that the base probability of detection is zero, that is, a cartel cannot be
uncovered without hard evidence.
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of detection is p + p 2 [0; 1]; and when only one rm keeps the hard evidence
the probability of detection is p + p
2
.14 In case of detection by the AA each
cartel member must pay a ne F . Both p and F are enforcement policy instru-
ments exogenously xed by the AA. We dene those instruments as the antitrust
enforcement policy.15
When the enforcement policy encompass a LP, the collusive rms that keep
hard evidence have an additional decision to make. In particular, they may choose
to exchange the hard evidence with lenient treatment or keep the hard evidence
without revealing it to the AA. Given that the hard evidence is symmetric only
the rst self-reporting rm is eligible for leniency. Moreover, we assume that the
rst self-reporting rms receives full amnesty. When both rms simultaneously
apply for leniency then each of them must pay an expected ne of F
2
.
Hard evidence is of pivotal importance for the success of the cartel. On the
one hand it may allow rms to overcome any administration and implementation
problems due to the complexity of their agreement. More precisely, we assume
that if at least one rm destroys the hard evidence, the management of the car-
tel is rendered more demanding and challenging, ultimately causing, with some
probability, the collapse of the cartel. We denote this probability by  2 [0; 1]
(henceforth the cartel collapse probability). Parameter  measures the sensitiv-
ity of the cartel to hard evidence. A higher  implies that the cartel agreement
is more complex (for instance, in terms of administration, allocation of duties and
tasks) and requires the existence of detailed hard evidence to overcome the ad-
ministration decit and/or implementation problems. At the extreme case where
 = 0 the cartels sustainability (administration and implementation) is indepen-
dent of hard evidence. If one rm destroys while the other keeps the hard evidence
then again the cartel may collapse. Although the rm that keeps the hard evidence
can administer the agreement the one that destroys may fail and thereby the cartel
may, as before, collapse with probability .
We further assume that if the cartel is implemented, the rms can perfectly
monitor the conformity to the agreement (i.e. the market is su¢ ciently transpar-
ent) and thus instantly react to any market defection.
Assumption 1 Provided that the collusive agreement is implemented rms in-
stantly react to any defections in the market when hard evidence exists.
14The upper bound on p reects our assumption that a cartel can be detected even if all of its
members destroy the hard evidence albeit with a weakly lower probability to the one associated
when hard evidence exists.
15The probability of detection p is a determinative factor of the deterrence e¤ect of the en-
forcement of antitrust policy. The limited resources available to AAs condition the level of this
probability. For empirical estimation of the probability of detection see Bryant and Eckard [1991],
Combe et al. [2008] and Ormosi [2011].
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Aubert et al. [2006] neglect this value associated with hard evidence. Although
we concede that this is a very strong assumption to be made it allows us, at the
same time, to simplify the analysis and focus our attention on deviations from
the individual terms of the agreement other than those referred to rmsmarket
conduct.
Given that we assume a pro-collusive market, when the enforcement policy does
not include a LP, rms have only one decision to make: either to keep or destroy
the hard evidence. When a LP is available, collusive rms have two sequential
decisions to make: either to keep or destroy, and if they keep, either to report
or not the hard evidence to the AA. We analyze these strategy proles and the
corresponding payo¤s in Sections 3 and 4.
To simplify the exposition we normalize non-collusive prots to zero. Per-rm
collusive prots are denoted by  2 (0; M ]. The upper bound denotes the per-
rm monopoly prots. Moreover, we assume that rms have the same discount
factor, denoted by ; and adopt standard grim trigger strategies to sustain their
agreement.
Another critical assumption we made is that a cartel that collapses due to
administration problems, this could be for instance the case where at least one
rm destroys the hard evidence, avoids prosecution.
Assumption 2 An unsuccessful cartel avoids prosecution.
3 Baseline Model: without Leniency Program
In this section we present the baseline model wherein the antitrust enforcement
policy does not include a LP. Given that we assume a pro-collusive market the
two rms have only one decision to make, namely, to keep or destroy the hard
incriminating evidence generated by the cartel. The analysis of this setup enables
us to rationalize rmsdecisions to keep hard evidence even though a LP is not
available. Moreover, it provides a benchmark to analyze the impact on the said
incentives of rms when a LP is available. Before deriving the subgame perfect
equilibrium (henceforth SPE) we formally present the game, that is, the timing,
strategies and payo¤s.
3.1 The timing of the stage game
In each period the timing of the game is as follows:
 Stage 0 (Policy Design): The AA commits and announces a certain
enforcement policy (p and F ).
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 Stage 1 (Cartel Formation): Having observed the policy parameters
and having full and complete information about parameters p and , rms
decide whether to communicate and form a cartel. Hard evidence is pro-
duced.
 Stage 2 (Keep or Destroy): Firms simultaneously decide whether to
keep or destroy the hard evidence of their illegal agreement.
 Stage 3 (Policy Implementation): The AA launches an investigation
into the market. The success of its investigation hinges on the existence or
not of hard evidence by collusive rms.
3.2 Firmsstrategies and payo¤s
For the purposes of our analysis we consider only the two symmetric strategy
proles: (Keep, Keep) and (Destroy, Destroy).16
First, consider the strategy prole (Keep, Keep). According to this both rms
agree to keep the hard evidence of their illegal communication. With probability
p + p rms obtain the collusive prots  but have to pay a ne F . With the
complement probability, that is, with 1 p p, rms evade detection and obtain
the collusive prots . If no deviation occurs, the game is repeated forever and
the collusive agreement is stable. The expected discounted value of this strategy
prole is equal to VK =
 (p+p)F
1  . VK is non-negative if

F
 p+p.
If a deviation occurs, that is, if one rm destroys the hard evidence instead, the
cartel will encounter administration problems and as a consequence with probabil-
ity  collapse. At the same time, given that only one rm keeps the hard evidence
the probability of cartel detection decreases to p + p
2
. Thus, the short-run gain
associated with a deviation from the strategy prescription is the lower expected
ne, given that the probability of detection decreases. This gain will be realized
by both rms only if the cartel does not collapse, that is, with probability 1  .
With probability  the cartel collapses and both rms obtain zero prots. Given
that a deviation occurs rms revert to a permanent punishment phase wherein
they obtain zero prots forever. Therefore, the expected payo¤ for the deviant
rm is equal to V dK = (1 )[  (p+ p2 )F ] (the superscript stands for deviation).
16There is also an asymmetric strategy prole that rms may coordinate on. In particular,
rms may agree that one of them will destroy, while the other will keep the hard evidence, i.e.
coordinate on (Destroy, Keep). The expected discounted payo¤ associate with this prole
is VKD =
(1 )
1  [   (p + p2 )F ]. However, this strategy prole is always Pareto dominated
by the symmetric ones. Notice that VK =
 (p+p)F
1  >
(1 )
1  [   (p + p2 )F ] = VKD and
VD =
(1 )( pF )
1  >
(1 )
1  [   (p + p2 )F ] = VKD. Therefore, to simplify our analysis we
discard the possibility that rms coordinate on asymmetric strategies.
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By Assumption 1, and given that the cartel is implemented with certainty,
any defection in the market is instantly detected and punished. Such deviation is
therefore inferior to the one described above.
Consider now the strategy prole (Destroy, Destroy). According to this
both rms agree to destroy the hard evidence of their illegal communication. Thus,
the cartel collapse with probability . Moreover, the cartel is detected with prob-
ability p, since no hard evidence exists, in which case the rms must pay a ne
F . If no deviation occurs then the game is repeated forever and the collusive
agreement is stable. The expected discounted payo¤ of this strategy prole is
VD =
(1 )( pF )
1  . VD is non-negative if

F
 p.
If a rm instead keeps the hard evidence, then the probability of cartel detection
increases to p+p
2
. The cartel remains fragile and collapse with probability  since
one rm, the one that conforms to the strategy prescription, destroys the hard
evidence. Given that a deviation occurs rms revert to a permanent punishment
phase wherein they obtain zero prots forever. Therefore, the expected payo¤ for
the deviant rm is equal to V dD = (1  )[   (p+ p2 )F ].
By the same line of reasoning, as elucidated before, a simultaneous deviation in
the market, provided that the cartel is implemented, is inferior to the one described
above.
At the beginning of this section we emphasize that we consider a pro-collusive
market. To guarantee this we need to make two assumptions. Firstly, that the
cartel is protable to be formed and is sustainable even in absence of antitrust
law enforcement. Given our assumption that rms sustain collusion by trigger
strategies this requires that   1
2
.17
Assumption 3   1
2
.
Secondly, the aforementioned strategies yield a non-negative payo¤ to rms.
For this we need to restrict the ne so that it is bounded above by collusive
prots.18
Assumption 4 
F
 1.
E¤ectively, this assumption implies that rms always nd it protable to col-
lude irrespective of the strictness of antitrust policy. This assumption could also
be justied on the basis that the ne level must not jeopardize rmsnancial
stability.
17See Friedman [1971] and Tirole [1988].
18Notice that the condition required so that (keep, keep) yields a non-negative payo¤ is more
stringent than the one required for (Destroy, Destroy).
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3.3 Equilibrium Analysis
The game we have to analyze is a repeated sequential move game with imperfect
information. Thus, the appropriate solution concept is subgame perfect equilib-
rium (henceforth SPE).19 We only consider pure strategies. When multiple
equilibria exist we apply the Pareto dominance criterion.20 Given that in our sce-
nario rms communicate with the aim to reach a collusive agreement it is not
unrealistic to assume that rms agree to orcherstrate their actions by coordinating
to a particular collusive strategy.
3.3.1 Solution of the baseline game
Suppose that the two rms agree to keep the hard evidence of their illegal communi-
cation, i.e. coordinate on (Keep, Keep). This strategy prole is a SPE if and only
if (henceforth i¤) VK > V dK . The latter inequality holds i¤
p  p1  F   (+ +1)p2(+ ) . Observe that p1 > 0 i¤ p < p1  F 2(+ )(+ +1)
and p1 < 1 p i¤p > p2  ( F   1) 2(+ )(1 )(1 ) . Hence, if the additional prob-
ability of detection is su¢ ciently low (p < p2) then (Keep, Keep) is a strict
SPE. If this probability is su¢ ciently high (p > p1) then (Keep, Keep) is not
a SPE.
Lemma 1 (Keep, Keep) is a SPE of the Keep-Destroy game if
p 2 [0;minfp1; 1 pg]:
Notice that p1 increases in  and F , while it decreases in p. The intuition is
the following. As the cartel becomes less sensitive to hard evidence then, ceteris
paribus, the deviation gain from the strategy prole (Keep, Keep) rise. Moreover,
the expected foregone collusive prots due to the collapse of the cartel increase,
ceteris paribus, in 
F
. Thus, an increase either in  or 
F
makes the CCE sharper.
In the case where 
F
is su¢ ciently high, and in particular if 
F
> (+ +1)p
2(+ ) ,
then (Keep, Keep) is a strict NE. On the contrary, an increase in the additional
probability of detection, causes, ceteris paribus, the deviation prots to shrink as
the expected ne increases. Therefore, the CDE intensies with a higher p.
Suppose now that the two rms agree to destroy the hard evidence, that is, co-
ordinate on (Destroy, Destroy). A unilateral deviation from this strategy pro-
le is not protable if VD  V dD. The latter inequality holds i¤p  p2  F+ (1 )p2 .
19A strategy is optimal in the sense of SPE if it maximizes playerspayo¤ for every period and
for every history of the game.
20A strategy satises this criterion if there is no other strategy for which each player of the
game has a strictly higher payo¤. Such a strategy is also called payo¤-dominant. The notion
of Pareto-dominant equilibrium is well established in the literature. See [Fudenberg and Tirole,
1991, pp. 20-22].
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Assumption 4 implies that p2  1, and hence (Destroy, Destroy) is a strict
SPE. This is due to the fact that if a rm keeps hard evidence, rather than de-
stroying it, the probability of detection increases by p
2
, while at the same time the
stability of the collusive agreement remains intact. Given that one of the two rms
complies with the prescriptions of the agreed strategy, and accordingly destroys
the hard evidence, the cartel continues to collapse with probability . Thus, such
deviation does not enhance the sustainability of the cartel. On the contrary, it
increases the expected ne, and thus the expected cost, of the cartel. Moreover,
given that a deviation from the agreed strategies occurs rms are deprived of future
collusive prots, as they enter in an eternal punishment phase.
Lemma 2 (Destroy, Destroy) is a strict SPE of the Keep-Destroy game.
For the set of parameter values of p and p where the Keep-Destroy game has
two SPE we apply the Pareto criterion. Thus, (Keep, Keep) Pareto dominates
(Destroy, Destroy) i¤ VK > VD. The latter inequality holds i¤
p < p3  F   p .
Lemma 3 (Keep, Keep) Pareto dominates (Destroy, Destroy) i¤ p < p3;
where p3  F   p :
By taking into consideration that (i) p3 > 0 i¤ p < p3   F and (ii)
p3 < 1 p i¤p > p4  1  ( F   1) and Lemmata 1, 2 and 3 we can state the
main result of this section.
Proposition 1 For given policy and other parameters (p, p, F; , ) the Pareto
dominant SPE of the baseline model without LP is:
1. (Keep, Keep) i¤:
(a) 
F
2 [1; 1

] and
i. p 2 [0;p4] and p 2 [0; 1 p] or
ii. p 2 [p4;p3] and p 2 [0; p3) or
(b) 
F
> 1

, p 2 [0; 1) and p 2 [0; 1 p]
2. (Destroy, Destroy) i¤ 
F
2 [1; 1

] and
(a) p 2 [p4;p3] and p 2 [p3; 1 p] or
(b) p 2 (p3; 1) and p 2 [0; 1 p]
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where p3  F   p , p3   F and p4  1  ( F   1).
Proof. See Appendix A.
Proposition 1 can be intuitively explained as follows. Firms keep hard evidence,
rather than destroying it, if the base probability of detection is relatively low, and
in particular lower than the threshold value p3. The latter balances the CCE, that
is, the expected foregone collusive prots if rms destroy the hard evidence ()
and the CDE, that is, the incremental expected ne due to keeping hard evidence
(pF ).21 The threshold value p3 is positively related to the collusive prots-ne
ratio and the cartel collapse probability and negatively related to the additional
probability of detection due to retaining hard evidence. Thus, an increase either
in the collusive prots-ne ratio or in the cartel collapse probability makes it more
likely that rms would refrain from destroying the hard evidence.
Consider the e¤ects of an increase in the cartel collapse probability. If rms
destroy the hard evidence the cartels expected prots shrinks, given that with a
higher probability the cartel collapses. At the same time if rms keep the hard
evidence the expected collusive prots are intact. In other words, the CCE is
reinforced, while the CDE remains unchanged. An increase in collusive prots
also strengthens the CCE, since rms forego higher future prots when the cartel
collapses. Moreover, the CDE is alleviated since the net gain from keeping hard
evidence increases. A similar argument holds when the ne decreases. Thus, rms
are more inclined to keep hard evidence both with an increase in the cartel collapse
probability and with an increase in the collusive prots-ne ratio. These e¤ects
are illustrated in Figure 1 below.
When the cartel collapse probability is zero, that is, cartels sustainability is
insensitive to hard evidence (i.e.  = 0) , rms always destroy the hard evidence.
Retaining evidence does not bring about any benet in that case. On the contrary,
when the cartel collapse probability in absence of hard evidence is su¢ ciently high
(i.e.  > 1
2
), the foregone prots linked to rmsdecision to destroy the hard
evidence are considerably high. In that case the CCE dominates the CDE. Thus,
rms keep hard evidence to sustain the cartel, although they run the risk of a
higher probability of detection.
While an increase in the additional probability of detection does not inuence
the CCE, such an increase bolsters the CDE. Thus, rms are more likely to destroy
the hard evidence. When this probability is su¢ ciently low (p < p5) then the
incremental ne associated with rms decision to keep hard evidence is very low,
the CDE dominates the CCE, making rms keep the hard evidence to enhance
the stability of the cartel. Conversely, when p is su¢ ciently high (p > p3)
21Notice that p3 can can be expressed as p3 = 1F ( pF ): The rst term in the parenthesis
captures the CCE, while the second term captures the CDE.
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Figure 1: Without LP. Graph A: An increase in  causes a non-parallel shift of p3 to
the right to p03. Graph B: An increase in

F
causes a parallel shift of p3 to the right to
p003. Both graphs are drawn with the initial assumption that

F
= 1.
then the incremental ne is very high, the CDE dominates the CCE, making rms
destroy the hard evidence (see Figure 1, Graph B).
Corollary 1 Firms are more likely to keep the hard evidence with a higher  and
a lower p. In the extreme case where  = 0, rms always destroy the hard
evidence. If  > 1
2
rms always keep the hard evidence.
4 Extended model: with Leniency Program
In this section we extend the baseline model so that a LP is part of the enforcement
policy. This extension allows to shed light on the inuence of a LP on rms
decision to keep or destroy hard evidence. Moreover, it enables to investigate the
conditions under which rms keep hard evidence albeit not report it to the AA.
Within this richer framework the cartel may be detected either by an AAs
own investigations or by a cartels member self-reporting to the AA, before an
investigation is initiated in the market.
4.1 The timing of the stage game
In each period the timing of the game is as follows:
 Stage 0 (Policy Design): The AA commits and announces a certain
enforcement policy which includes a LP.
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 Stage 1 (Cartel Formation): Having observed the enforcement pol-
icy and having full and complete information about parameters p and ,
rms decide whether to communicate and form a cartel. Hard evidence is
produced.
 Stage 2 (Keep or Destroy): Firms simultaneously decide whether to
keep or destroy the hard evidence of their illegal agreement. If rms choose
to keep the hard evidence then move to Stage 3. If rms destroy the hard
evidence then move to Stage 3 with probability 1 . With probability 
the cartel collapse and rms obtain zero prots. The game restarts from
Stage 0.
 Stage 3 (Revelation of hard evidence): Firms simultaneously decide
whether to report or not the hard evidence to the AA.
 Stage 4 (Policy Implementation): If at least one rm applies for le-
niency then the cartel is detected. If no rm applies for leniency then the AA
initiates an investigation into the market. The success of its investigation
hinges on the existence of hard convicting evidence.
4.2 Firmsstrategies and payo¤s
For the purposes of our analysis we consider only the three symmetric strategy
proles: (Destroy, Destroy), (Keep and Not Report, Keep and Not
Report) and (Keep and Report, Keep and Report).22
Consider rst the strategy prole (Destroy, Destroy). The two colluding
rms agree to destroy the hard evidence. As shown in Section 3.2 the expected
discounted payo¤ associated with this strategy prole is VD =
(1 )( pF )
1  . A
deviant rm that keeps the hard evidence, rather than destroying it, has two
options. Either to report the evidence to the AA and obtain full amnesty or not
report the hard evidence. In the former case the deviant rm receives an expected
payo¤ equal to V (d;r)D = (1   ), while in the latter case its expected payo¤ is
V
(d;nr)
D = (1   )[   (p + p2 )F ]. Clearly a deviant rm will never keep hard
22There are also other possible (asymmetric) strategy proles that rms may coordinate on:
(Destroy, Keep and Report), (Destroy, Keep and Not Report) and (Keep and Re-
port, Keep and Not Report). (Destroy, Keep and Not Report) is Pareto dominated
by (Destroy, Destroy), as VD =
(1 )( pF )
1  >
(1 )[ (p+p2 )F ]
1  = VD;KNR. (Destroy,
Keep and Report) is Pareto dominated by (Keep and Report, Keep and Report), as
VKR =
 F2
1  >
(1 )(2 F )
2(1 ) = VD;KR. Note also that the strategy prole (Keep and Report,
Keep and Not Report) yields the same payo¤ as the strategy prole (Keep and Report, Keep
and Report). This is intuituve given that only one rm is eligible to receive amnesty.
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evidence without reporting it to the AA, as V dD > V
d
0
D . An analogous argument to
the baseline model holds with regards to deviations in the market.
Remark 1 A rm that deviates from (Destroy, Destroy) will never keep hard
evidence without reporting it to the AA.
Consider now the strategy prole (Keep and Not Report, Keep and Not
Report). The two colluding rms agree to keep the hard evidence, nonetheless,
not report it to the AA.23 Given that both rms keep hard evidence the cartel
is detected with probability p + p, in which case rms must pay a ne F . The
expected discounted payo¤ of this strategy prole is VKNR =
 (p+p)F
1  . Two
types of deviation from this strategy prole are possible. A rm may deviate at the
revelation stage and report the hard evidence to the AA. In that case the deviant
rm receives full amnesty. Given that the cartel does not collapse, since the two
rms continue to keep hard evidence, the deviation payo¤ is V (d;r)KNR = . If instead
a deviation occurs at the keep-destroy stage, whereby the deviant rm destroys
the hard evidence, the probability of detection decreases to p+ p
2
. However, the
cartel may in that case collapse with probability . Thus, the expected deviation
payo¤ is V (d;nr)KNR = (1 )[ (p+ p2 )F ]. Clearly, a deviant rm will never destroy
the hard evidence, given that V (d;r)KNR > V
(d;nr)
KNR .
A similar argument for the deviation in the market as in the benchmark model
without LP holds. Therefore, a simultaneous deviation in the revelation stage
or in the keep-destroy stage with deviation in the market is inferior, in terms of
protability, to the deviations described above.
Remark 2 A rm that deviates from (Keep and Not Report, Keep and
Not Report) will never destroy the hard evidence.
Lastly, consider the strategy prole (Keep and Report, Keep and Re-
port). The two collusive rms agree to keep hard evidence and subsequently re-
port it to the AA. The cartel is detected with certainty and rms pay an expected
ne F
2
. The expected discounted payo¤ of this strategy prole is VKR =
 F
2
1  .
Again, two types of deviations may occur from this strategy prole. A rm may
deviate at the keep-destroy stage and instead of keeping the hard evidence destroy
it. If this is the case then the cartel collapse with probability . At the same time,
the cartel is detected with certainty given that the compliant rm keeps and reports
the hard evidence to the AA. The deviant rms payo¤ is V dKR = (1  )(   F ).
23(Keep, Keep) from Section 3 is equivalent to (Keep and Not Report, Keep and Not
Report). However, the deviations from this strategy prole are di¤erent. A rm that deviates
from (Keep and Not Report, Keep and Not Report) can now report the hard evidence.
This option is not available to rms when a LP does not exist.
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Indeed, deviating from this strategy does not bring about any benet, as such
deviation radically increases the probability of paying a ne and at the same time
it deprives the deviator, as well as the compliant rm, all future collusive prots.
The second type of deviation may occur at the revelation stage. Trivially, any
deviation at this stage will be unprotable as the deviant rm pays the full ne
F with certainty, rather than an expected ne of F
2
. Besides, rms are deprived
of future collusive prots as they enter a permanent punishment phase. The same
line of reasoning for the simultaneous deviation in the market holds as for the
strategy proles discussed above.
4.3 Equilibrium Analysis
The game we have to analyze in this section is a repeated sequential move game
with imperfect information. Contrary to the game in Section 3 the rm(s) that
choose to keep the hard evidence at the Keep-Destroy stage have an additional
decision to make at the revelation stage: either to report the hard evidence to the
AA or not. This option for rms that keep hard evidence transpires as a result of
the availability of the LP.
As in Section 3 the appropriate solution concept is SPE. We only consider pure
strategies. When multiple equilibria exist we apply the Pareto dominance selection
criterion.
4.3.1 Revelation subgame - Report v. Not Report
This subgame is reached if rms have already chosen to keep the hard evidence at
the Keep-Destroy subgame. Firmsdecision is either to report the hard evidence
to the AA or keep the hard evidence without reporting to the AA.
To begin with suppose that the two rms agree to keep the hard evidence and
subsequently report it to the AA, i.e. they coordinate on (Keep and Report,
Keep and Report). The latter is a NE i¤ VKR  V dKR. Given Assumption 4
this inequality always holds.
Lemma 4 (Keep and Report, Keep and Report) is a strict NE of the
Revelation subgame.
Suppose now that rms agree to keep the hard evidence, nevertheless not report
it to the AA, i.e. coordinate on (Keep and Not Report, Keep and Not
Report). The latter is a NE i¤ VKNR  V dKNR which holds i¤ p+p   F .
Lemma 5 (Keep and Not Report, Keep and Not Report) is a NE of the
Revelation subgame i¤ p+p   
F
.
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Notice that when  
F
> 1, (Keep and Not Report, Keep and Not Re-
port) is a strict NE.
Given Lemmata 4 and 5 we apply the Pareto criterion. Thus, (Keep and
Report, Keep and Report) Pareto dominates (Keep and Not Report,
Keep and Not Report) i¤ VKR > VKNR. The latter inequality holds i¤
p+p > 1
2
.
Lemma 6 The Pareto dominant NE of the Revelation subgame is:
1. (Keep and Not Report, Keep and Not Report) i¤ p+p  1
2
2. (Keep and Report, Keep and Report) i¤ p+p > 1
2
Proof. See Appendix B.
In words, if the (aggregate) probability of detection when rms keep hard
evidence is relatively high, in particular p+p > 1
2
, rms report the hard evidence.
The underlying reasoning is that when the probability of detection with hard
evidence is greater (lower) than 1
2
, the ne that rms expect to pay, in case of
detection by the AA, is greater (lower) than the one associated with self-reporting.
We now proceed backwards to the Keep-Destroy subgame. Depending on which
strategy dominates at the revelation subgame we distinguish, by Lemma 6, two
cases, which we examine below.
4.3.2 Keep-Destroy subgame for p+p > 1
2
If p+p > 1
2
then by Lemma 6 at the revelation stage the rms self-report to the
AA, provided that they keep hard evidence. Thus, for those parametersvalues
rmsdecisions is either to destroy the hard evidence or keep the hard evidence
and then report it to the AA.
To begin with, suppose that the two rms agree to keep the hard evidence (and
subsequently report it to the AA). This forms a NE i¤ VKR  V dKR. The latter
inequality always holds given that  2 [0; 1].
Lemma 7 (Keep and Report, Keep and Report) is a strict NE of the
Keep-Destroy subgame for p+p > 1
2
:
Suppose now that rms agree to destroy the hard evidence, i.e. coordinate on
(Destroy, Destroy). This strategy prole forms a NE i¤ VD  V dD. The latter
inequality holds i¤ p   
F
.
Lemma 8 (Destroy, Destroy) is a NE of the Keep-Destroy subgame if
p   
F
.
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Considering that p 2 [0; 1  p] from Lemma 8 we can distinguish two cases:
either i)  
F
 1   p or ii)  
F
> 1   p. If the former condition holds then
for p >  
F
(Keep and Report, Keep and Report) is the unique NE of the
Keep-Destroy subgame. Otherwise, both (Destroy, Destroy) and (Keep and
Report, Keep and Report), are NE of the Keep-Destroy.
Lemma 9 For p+p > 1
2
the Keep-Destroy subgame has two NE i¤:
1.  
F
 1 p and p 2 [1
2
 p;  
F
] or
2.  
F
> 1 p and p 2 [maxf0; 1
2
 pg; 1 p]
Given Lemma 9 we apply the Pareto criterion. Thus, (Keep and Report,
Keep and Report) Pareto dominates (Destroy, Destroy) i¤VKR > VD. The
latter inequality holds i¤ p > p4  F 22(1 )F .
Lemma 10 (Keep and Report, Keep and Report) Pareto dominates (Destroy,
Destroy) i¤ p > p4  F 22(1 )F :
By taking into consideration that i) p4 < 0 i¤ F >
1
2
, ii) p4 < 12   p i¤
p < p5  1  F   2(1 ) and iii) p4 > 1  p i¤ p < p6  1 22(1 ) + 1  F ,
and Lemma 10 we establish the Pareto dominant SPE of the game when p+p > 1
2
.
Lemma 11 The Pareto dominant SPE of the model with LP for p+p > 1
2
is:
1. (Keep and Report, Keep and Report) i¤:
(a)  < 1
2
and
i. 
F
2 [1; 1
2
], p < p5 and p 2 [12  p; 1 p] or
ii. 
F
2 [1; 1
2
], p 2 [p5;p6] and p 2 (p4; 1 p] or
iii. 
F
> 1
2
and p 2 [maxf0; 1
2
 pg; 1 p] or
(b)  > 1
2
, 
F
 1 and p 2 [maxf0; 1
2
 pg; 1 p]
2. (Destroy, Destroy) i¤  < 1
2
, 
F
2 [1; 1
2
] and
(a) p 2 [p5;p6] and p 2 [maxf0; 12  pg; p4] or
(b) p > p6 and p 2 [0; 1 p]
where p4 =
F 2
2(1 )F , p5 =

1 

F
  
2(1 ) and p6 =
1 2
2(1 ) +

1 

F
.
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Proof. See Appendix B.
The intuition underlying Lemma 11 is the following. Firms keep the hard
evidence and subsequently report it to the AA, rather than destroying it, if p is
relatively high, and in particular greater than the threshold value p4. The latter
balances the CCE () and the CAE (F
2
).24 The threshold value p4 is negatively
related both, to  and 
F
. Thus, with an increase either in  or in 
F
rms are less
inclined to destroy the hard evidence. An increase in  makes the CCE sharper,
as the foregone prots in case of the collapse of the cartel are greater, leaving the
CDE intact. When  is su¢ ciently high ( > 1
2
), the CCE outweights the CAE.
The foregone prots in the case where the cartel collapse are greater than the
expected ne with self-reporting. Thus, rms keep and report the hard evidence
to the AA. An increase in 
F
makes the CCE sharper, while at the same time it
mitigates the CDE. Moreover, when 
F
is su¢ ciently high ( 
F
> 1
2
) then rms
always keep the hard evidence.
Suppose that  is relatively low ( < 1
2
) and that p, the base probability
of detection, is also relatively low, while p is su¢ ciently high (p > p6),
but at the same time the aggregate probability of detection is relatively high
(p +p > 1
2
). Then, the expected cost associated with rmsdecision to destroy
the hard evidence, that is, the sum of the ne rms have to pay in case of detection
by the AA on the basis of indirect evidence and the expected foregone prots
in case of the collapse of the cartel, is lower than the ne associated with self-
reporting to the AA. Thus, rms destroy the hard evidence. On the contrary, if
p is su¢ ciently low (p < p5) then the expected ne with self-reporting (F2 )
is lower than the cost associated with rmsdecision to destroy the hard evidence
(expected ne and expected foregone prots). Thus rms keep the hard evidence
to exploit the LP.
Corollary 2 Firms are less likely to destroy the hard evidence with a higher 
and 
F
and lower p:
4.3.3 Keep-Destroy subgame for p+p  1
2
If p + p  1
2
then by Lemma 6 rms do not self-report at the revelation stage,
provided that they indeed keep hard evidence. Thus, for those parametersval-
ues rmsdecision is between destroying and keeping the hard evidence without
disclosing it to the AA.
To begin with, suppose that the two rms agree to destroy the hard evidence,
i.e. coordinate on (Destroy, Destroy). This strategy prole is a NE if no
protable unilateral deviation exists, i.e. i¤ VD  V dD. The latter inequality
always holds.
24Notice that p4 can be expressed as: p4 = 1(1 )F (
F
2   ).
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Lemma 12 (Destroy, Destroy) is a strict NE of the keep-Destroy subgame
for p+p  1
2
.
Suppose now that rms agree to keep the hard evidence that, however, they
do not report to the AA at the revelation stage, i.e. coordinate on (Keep and
Not Report, Keep and Not Report). This strategy prole is a NE i¤
VKNR  V dKNR. This inequality holds i¤ p  p5  F   (+ +1)p2(+ ) .
Lemma 13 (Keep and Not Report, Keep and Not Report) is a NE of
the Keep-Destroy subgame i¤ p  p5.
Given Lemmata 12 and 13 for p  p5 there are two NE. Taking into account that
i) p5 >
1
2
 p and ii) p5 > 0 i¤p < p7  F 2(+ )+ +1 ; we conclude that (Keep
and Not Report, Keep and Not Report) Pareto dominates (Destroy,
Destroy) if VKNR > VD. The latter inequality holds i¤ p < p3  F   p . Notice
that this is the same condition as in the baseline model, however here it holds only
for p+p  1
2
.
Lemma 14 Keep and not Report, Keep and not Report) Pareto domi-
nates (Destroy, Destroy) i¤ p < p3  F   p .
By taking into consideration that: i) p3 > 0 i¤p < p3   F and p3 < 12 p
i¤p  p5  1  ( F   12) and Lemma 14 we establish the Pareto dominant SPE
of the game for p+p  1
2
.
Lemma 15 The Pareto dominant SPE of the model with LP for p+p  1
2
is:
1. (Keep and Not Report, Keep and Not Report) i¤:
(a)  < 1
2
and
i. 
F
2 [1; 1
2
]; p < p5 and p 2 [0; 12  p] or
ii. 
F
2 [1; 1
2
]; p 2 [p5;p3] and p 2 [0; p3] or
iii. 
F
2 [ 1
2
; 1

]; p < 1
2
and p 2 [0; 1
2
 p] or
iv. 
F
> 1

; p < 1
2
and p 2 [0; 1
2
 p] or
(b)  > 1
2
; 
F
 1; p < 1
2
and p 2 [0; 1
2
 p]
2. (Destroy, Destroy) i¤  < 1
2
and
(a) 
F
2 [1; 1
2
], p 2 [p5;p3] and p 2 [p3; 12  p] or
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(b) 
F
2 [1; 1
2
], [p3; 12 ] and p 2 [0; 12  p]
where p3 = F   p , p3 =  F and p5 = 1  F   2(1 ) .
Proof. See Appendix B.
The intuition of Lemma 15 is the following. Firms keep hard evidence without
reporting it to the AA, rather than destroying, if p is relatively low, and in partic-
ular lower than the threshold value p3. The latter balances the CCE and the CDE.
The threshold value of p3 is positively related to F and  and negatively related
to p. Thus, an increase either in 
F
or in  makes rms less prone to destroy the
hard evidence. Equivalently, it makes it more likely that rms will keep neverthe-
less not report the hard evidence. Such changes make the CCE more acute, while
at the same time they alleviate the CDE. When  is su¢ ciently high ( > 1
2
), the
CCE outweights the CDE so that the rms keep hard evidence without reporting
it to the AA, rather than destroying it.
The CCE is immuned to a change in p. Such a change, on the contrary,
markedly a¤ects the CDE. Specically, an increase (decrease) p makes the CDE
more (less) acute. Thus, an increase in p makes rmsdecision to destroy the
hard evidence more likely. When p is su¢ ciently low (p < p5) then the CCE
dominates the CDE (p3 becomes greater than 1) and thus rms always keep the
hard evidence. Conversely, when p is su¢ ciently high (p > p3) then the CDE
dominates the CCE (p3 becomes negative) and thus rms always destroy the hard
evidence.
Corollary 3 Firms are less prone to destroy the hard evidence with a higher  or

F
. They are less likely to keep the hard evidence with a higher p.
By Lemmata 11 and 15 we can state the main proposition of this section.
Proposition 2 For given policy and other parameters (p, p, F; , ) the Pareto
dominant SPE of the extended game with LP is:
1. (Destroy, Destroy) i¤  < 1
2
, 
F
2 [1; 1
2
] and
(a) p 2 [p5;p3] and p 2 [p3; 12  p] or
(b) [p3; 12) and p 2 [0; 12  p] or
(c) p 2 [p5;p6] and p 2 [maxf0; 12  pg; p4] or
(d) p > p6 and p 2 [0; 1 p]
2. (Keep and Not Report, Keep and Not Report) i¤:
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(a)  < 1
2
and
i. 
F
2 [1; 1
2
]; p < p5 and p 2 [0; 12  p] or
ii. 
F
2 [1; 1
2
]; p 2 [p5;p3] and p 2 [0; p3) or
iii. 
F
> 1
2
; p < 1
2
and p 2 [0; 1
2
 p] or
(b)  > 1
2
; 
F
 1; p < 1
2
and p 2 [0; 1
2
 p]
3. (Keep and Report, Keep and Report) i¤:
(a)  < 1
2
and
i. 
F
2 [1; 1
2
], p < p5 and p 2 [12  p; 1 p] or
ii. 
F
2 [1; 1
2
], p 2 [p5;p6] and p 2 (p4; 1 p] or
iii. 
F
> 1
2
and p 2 [maxf0; 1
2
 pg; 1 p] or
(b)  > 1
2
, 
F
 1 and p 2 [maxf0; 1
2
 pg; 1 p]
where p3 = F   p , p4 = F 22(1 )F , p3 =  F , p5 = 1  F   2(1 ) and
p6 =
1 2
2(1 ) +

1 

F
.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Depending on the parametersvalues of the game (p; p; ;  ; F ), all three
strategies could emerge as Pareto dominant SPE. If the base probability of detec-
tion is relatively low, and in particular lower than the threshold value p3, rms
agree to keep, nevertheless not report the hard evidence to the AA. In that case
rms keep the hard evidence to enhance cartels sustainability rather than to
exploit the LP. Conversely, if the base probability is su¢ ciently high, and in par-
ticular greater than the threshold value p3, rms agree to keep the hard evidence
and then report to the AA. In that case rms keep the hard evidence to exploit
the LP rather than to enhance cartels sustainability. For intermediate values of
the base probability of detection, that is, for p 2 [p3; p4], the CDE and the CAE
prevail over the CCE. Thus, rms destroy the hard evidence in order to minimize
the probability of cartel detection.
Firms are more prone to keep hard evidence and either report not with a higher
 or 
F
. Their decision on whether to self-report or not depends on the aggregate
probability of detection. Firms are less prone to keep without reporting if p or p
increase.
Corollary 4 Firms are less likely to destroy the hard evidence when  or 
F
in-
crease. They are more likely to destroy hard evidence when p decrease.
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Figure 2: With LP. Graph A shows the e¤ect of an increase in . Graph B shows
the e¤ect of an increase in 
F
. Both graphs are drawn with the initial assumption that

F
= 1.
We have to underline though that when  is su¢ ciently high ( > 1
2
), rms
never destroy the hard evidence. With a su¢ ciently high  the expected foregone
prots are higher than the expected ne associated with rms decision to keep the
hard evidence. Moreover, if p is su¢ ciently high (p > 1
2
) then rms always
keep and exploit the LP by reporting the evidence to the AA. In this latter case
the expected ne with self-reporting is lower than the one without self-reporting.
The same conclusion is reached if 
F
is su¢ ciently high ( 
F
> 1
2
).
Corollary 5 If  < 1
2
and 
F
> 1
2
or  > 1
2
then rms always keep hard evidence.
If in addition p < 1
2
then the Pareto dominant SPE is (Keep and Report,
Keep and Report) if p 2 [1
2
 p; 1 p] and (Keep and Not Report, Keep
and Not Report) if p 2 [0; 1
2
  p]. However, if p  1
2
the unique Pareto
dominant SPE is (Keep and Report, Keep and Report) 8p 2 [0; 1 p].
If  = 0 and p > 1
2
(implying that p < 1
2
) then rms always destroy the
hard evidence.25 In words, if the cartels sustainability is independent of hard
evidence and if the additional probability of detection is su¢ ciently high (i.e.
p > 1
2
), the unique SPE is (Destroy, Destroy). Given that  = 0 the
CCE evaporates. Moreover, for these parametersvalues the CDE dominates the
25If  = 0 then p3 = 0, p5 = 0 and p6 = 12 :
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CAE, i.e. the expected ne with self-reporting is lower than the one without self-
reporting. Given that the expected ne with self-reporting is higher than the cost
associated with rmsdecision to destroy the hard evidence (foregone prots and
expected ne), rms destroy the evidence. On the other hand, if the additional
probability of detection is relatively low (p < 1
2
) rms destroy the hard evidence
as long as the base probability of detection is relatively low (p < 1
2
). In that case
the CDE dominates both the CAE and the CCE. The expected ne rms have
to pay if convicted on the basis of indirect evidence is lower than the one rms
have to pay if they decide to keep the hard evidence regardless of reporting or
not to the AA. On the contrary, if the base probability of detection is su¢ ciently
high (p > 1
2
) then rms keep the hard evidence and exploit the LP. In the latter
case the CAE dominates the CDE. For a graphical illustration see Figure 3 below
(Graphs A and B).
Corollary 6 If  = 0 then for any p < 1
2
(p > 1
2
) rms always destroy (keep) the
hard evidence.
If  = 1, that is, if hard evidence is imperative for the survival of the cartel
then rms always keep the hard evidence. The decision on whether to apply for
leniency depends on the aggregate probability of detection. If it is relatively high
(p + p > 1
2
) then rms always nd it advantageous to exploit the LP as the
expected ne with self-reporting is lower than that without self-reporting. If it is
relatively low (p+p < 1
2
) then rms keep nevertheless not report. The expected
ne without self-reporting is lower than the one associated with rmsdecision to
self-report. For a graphical illustration see Graph C in Figure 3.
Corollary 7 When  = 1 rms always keep hard evidence. If in addition
p + p > 1
2
then they exploit the LP. Otherwise, they keep the hard evidence
only to sustain the cartel.
4.4 Comparison with the baseline model without LP
To simplify the comparison of the two settings, with and without LP, let without
loss of generality  = F so that 
F
= 1. Then, a simple contrast of Propositions 1
and 2 reveal that the introduction of the LP as part of the enforcement policy makes
rms more prone to keep the hard evidence. The reason is that the introduction
of the LP provides an option value to those rms that keep hard evidence. Firms
keep hard evidence not only to enhance the administration of their agreement,
and sustain the cartel, but also to exploit the LP, when such an exploitation is
advantageous for them.
Figure 4 below illustrates the e¤ects of the introduction of a LP. Notice that
for p 2 [1
2
 p; p3] rms continue to keep the hard evidence, however, they exploit
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Figure 3: Some extreme cases. Graph A: 
F
= 1 and  = 0. Graph B: 
F
= 1 and
 = 1
2
. Graph C: 
F
= 1 and  = 1.
the LP by reporting to the AA (indicated by NR! R). The primal objective for
keeping hard evidence is to enhance the administration of their unlawful agreement
and not to exploit the LP. However, rms also nd it protable to exploit the LP
and pay a lower ne in case of conviction. For p > maxfp3; p4g rmsdecisions
at the keep-destroy stage is reversed. Now rms keep the hard evidence primarily
to exploit the LP (indicated by D ! KR in Figure 4 below). The expected
ne linked to rmsdecisions to keep and report the hard evidence is lower than
the cost associated with rmsdecision to destroy the evidence (foregone prots
and expected ne). Therefore, by keeping hard evidence the rms enhance the
administration of their agreement, and thus sustain the cartel, and simultaneously
exploit the LP by self-reporting.
Corollary 8 For p 2 [1
2
 p; p3] rmsdecisions to keep the hard evidence, when
a LP is available, is intact.26 However, rms exploit the LP by reporting the hard
evidence to the AA. On the contrary, for p > maxfp3; p4g rms decisions to
destroy the hard evidence is reversed when a LP is available.27 Firms keep the
hard evidence primarily to exploit the LP.
26Notice that p 2 [ 12  p; p3] if p < p5.
27Equivalently, if (i) p > p5 and p 2 [p3; 1 p] or (ii) p > p5.
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Figure 4: The impact of a LP on rmsdecision.
5 Conclusions
The motivation of this paper derives from the empirical observation that many
collusive rms keep hard evidence, even when the enforcement policy does not
encompass a LP. We provide plausible answers to three relevant questions: 1) why
rms keep hard evidence when a LP is not available, 2) what is the impact of a
LP on rmsdecisionsto keep or destroy hard evidence and 3) why rms keep
hard evidence, nevertheless not report to the AA.
In absence of a LP we have showed that rmsdecisions to keep or destroy
the hard incriminating evidence of their illegal communication hinges upon i) the
sensitivity of cartels administration and implementation to hard evidence, ii) the
increase in the probability of detection when rms keep the hard evidence and iii)
the collusive prots-ne ratio. Reecting on these theoretical results our paper
propose three alternative, but not exclusionary, explanations for the empirical
observation that many collusive rms keep hard evidence even when a LP is not
part of the enforcement policy. First, cartels administration and implementation
is very sensitive to hard evidence, so that rms keep hard evidence to enhance the
stability of their illicit agreement. Second, the e¢ ciency of the AA in detecting
and prosecuting cartels with hard evidence is relatively low, or the quality of
hard evidence is poor, so that the expected incremental ne, if rms keep the hard
evidence, is lower than the expected forgone prots associated with rmsdecisions
to destroy the hard evidence. And third, the level of the ne imposed on detected
cartels is su¢ ciently lower than the accrued collusive prots, so that rms have
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more to lose if they destroy the hard evidence and less to pay if detected by the
AA.
We have also showed that the introduction of a LP as a policy instrument
reinforce rms incentives to keep hard evidence. The LP essentially provides
to those rms that keep hard evidence an option value, which, ceteris paribus,
decreases the expected ne. Thus, rms may keep the hard evidence not only to
enhance the stability of the cartel but also to exploit the LP. The empirical fact
that we are experiencing more cartels self-reporting may, therefore, be a side-e¤ect
of the introduction of LPs.
Finally, collusive rms may keep hard evidence without reporting to the AA.
We have showed that this behavior is more likely to manifest when i) the prob-
ability in which the cartel collapse in absence of hard evidence increases, ii) the
collusive prots-ne ratio increases and iii) the additional probability of cartel
detection decreases. Accordingly the empirical fact that AAs investigations ex-
pose hard evidence retained by cartelsmembers can be justied on three grounds.
First, that the cartel is very sensitive to hard evidence, so that rms keep hard
evidence to enhance the survival rate of the cartel. Second, that the e¢ ciency
of the AA in detecting and prosecuting cartels with hard evidence is su¢ ciently
low, so that the incremental and total expected ne is lower than the expected
ne with self-reporting. And third, that the level of the ne imposed on detected
cartels is su¢ ciently lower than the accrued collusive prots, so that rms have
more to lose if they destroy the hard evidence and less to pay if detected by the
AA. It is worth noting that all results in our paper are obtained without allowing
for positive rewards.
Despite the simple setting, our paper sheds some light on rmsdecisions to
keep or destroy the hard incriminating evidence that is generated by the cartel
as well as on rmsdecisions to report or not the hard evidence to the AA. By
abstracting from behavioral elements or cognitive biases our paper predicts a par-
ticular pattern of behavior by colluding rms. However, our understanding of the
underlying reasons justifying rmsdecisions to keep or destroy the hard evidence
may be enriched if we diverge from the realm of rational choice theory by inte-
grating bounded rationality in the analysis. For instance, collusive rms may be
time inconsistent or overcondent, although they know they have to destroy the
hard evidence when they do it is too late!. Such extension to the literature could
o¤er alternative explanations with regard to the research questions of this paper
and indeed may come up with very di¤erent patterns of behavior. This research
avenue remains open to future exploration.
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Appendix A - Proof of Proposition 1
Lemma 16 1. p1  0 i¤ p  p1, where p1  F 2(+ )(+ +1)
2. p1 > 1 i¤ F >
+ +1
2(+ )
3. p1 +p  1 i¤ p  p2, where p2  2(+ )(1 )(1 )( F   1)
4. p2 > 1 i¤ F >
+ +1
2(+ )
5. p1  p2 i¤ F 2 [1; + +12(+ ) ].
Proof of Lemma 16
(1) To show: p1 > 0 i¤p < p1, where p1  F 2(+ )(+ +1) :
p1  0,

F
  ( +     + 1)p
2( +    )  0,
p  
F
2( +    )
( +     + 1)  p1
) QED:
(2) To show: p1 > 1 i¤ F >
+ +1
2(+ ) :
p1 > 1 ,

F
2( +    )
( +     + 1) > 1,

F
>
 +     + 1
2( +    )
) QED:
(3) To show: p1 +p  1 i¤p > p2, where p2  2(+ )(1 )(1 )( F   1):
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F
  ( +     + 1)p
2( +    ) + p  1,
(

F
  1)  p( +     + 1
2( +       1),
p  2( +    )
(1  )(1  )(

F
  1)  p2
) QED:
(4) To show: p2 > 1 i¤ F >
+ +1
2(+ ) :
p2 > 1,
2( +    )
(1  )(1  )(

F
  1) > 1,

F
  1 > (1  )(1  )
2( +    ) ,

F
>
(1  )(1  )
2( +    ) + 1,

F
>
 +     + 1
2( +    )
) QED:
(5) To show: p1 > p2 i¤ F 2 [1; + +12(+ ) ]:
p1 > p2 ,

F
2( +    )
( +     + 1) >
2( +    )
(1  )(1  )(

F
  1),

F
<
1 +  +    
2( +    )
true given that

F
2 [1;  +     + 1
2( +    ) ]
) QED:
If 
F
2 [1; + +1
2(+ ) ] then both p1  1 (from Lemma 16(2)) and p2  1
(from Lemma 16(4)). Moreover, p1 > p2 (from Lemma 16(5)). Hence, if
p < p2 then p1 > 1 p so that for all p 2 [0; 1 p] (Keep, Keep) is a NE.
31
If p 2 [p2;p1] then p 2 [0; 1 p] and thus for all p < p1 (Keep, Keep) is a
NE. Moreover, if p > p1 then p1 < 0 so that (Keep, Keep) is not a NE. The
intuition for the latter result is the following. If the additional probability with
which the collusive rms are detected in the presence of hard evidence is su¢ ciently
high then each rm has a unilateral incentive to deviate from the agreement and
destroy the hard evidence. By destroying the hard evidence the probability of
detection and therefore of paying the ne decreases by p
2
. This decrease is higher
when p is high. If on the other hand 
F
> + +1
2(+ ) then both p1 > 1 (from
Lemma 16(2)) and p2 > 1 (from Lemma 16(4)), implying that p1 > 0 and
p1 > 1   p. In this case (Keep, Keep) is a NE of the Keep-Destroy subgame
for all p 2 [0; 1  p] . Hence, if the ratio of collusive prots to ne is relatively
high then no rm has an incentive to deviate from (Keep, Keep). Any deviation
in that case will result in deprivation of future prots which is very costly given
that the level of the ne is relatively low compared to the collusive prots.
Lemma 17 (Keep, Keep) is a NE of the Keep-Destroy game if:
1. 
F
2 [1; + +1
2(+ ) ] and either a) p < p2 and p 2 [0; 1   p] or b) p 2
[p2;p1] and p 2 [0; p1] or
2. 
F
> + +1
2(+ )
Lemma 18 1. p3  0 i¤ p < p3; where p3 =  F
2. p3 > 1 i¤ F >
1

3. p3  1 p i¤ p  p4; where p4 = 1  ( F   1)
4. p4 > 1 i¤ F >
1

5. p2 > p4
6. p3 > p2
7. p1 > p3
8. p1 > p3 > p2 > p4
9. p1 > p3
10. + +1
2(+ ) <
1

11. p3 > p4 i¤ F <
1

:
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Proof of Lemma 18
(1) To show: p3  0 i¤p  p3; where p3   F :
p3  0

F
  p

 0,


F
 p,
p   
F
 p3
) QED:
(2) To show: p3 > 1 i¤ F >
1

.


F
> 1,

F
>
1

) QED:
(4) To show: p3  1 p i¤p  p4; where p4 = 1  ( F   1):
p3  1 p,

F
  p

 1 p,

F
  1  p( 1

  1),
p  
1   (

F
  1)  p4
) QED:
(5) To show: p2 > p4:
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p2 > p4
2( +    )
1  ( +    )(

F
  1) > 
1   (

F
  1)
2( +    )(1  ) > [1  ( +    )],
( +    )(2  2 + ) >  ,
( +    )(2  ) >  ,
2 + 2(1  )  2   (1  ) >  ,
(1  ) + (2  )(1  ) > 0
true
) QED:
(6) To show: p3 > p2 i¤ F [1;
+ +1
2(+ ) ]:
By contradiction. Suppose that:
p2 > p3
2( +    )
1  ( +    )(

F
  1) >  
F
2( +    )( 
F
  1) > [1  ( +    )] 
F

F
(2( +    )   + ( +    ) > 2( +    )

F
>
2( +    )
2(1  ) + (1  ) + 2
Notice that 2(+ )
2(1 )+(1 )+2 > 1.
2( +    )
2(1  ) + (1  ) + 2 > 1
2( +    ) > 2(1  ) + (1  ) + 2
2 + 2(1  ) < 2(1  ) + (1  ) + 2
(1  )  2(1  ) > 0
(1  )(1  ) > 0
always true given that ;  < 1
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But given that 
F
[1; + +1
2(+ ) ] this leads to a contradiction since:
2( +    )
2(1  ) + (1  ) + 2 >
 +     + 1
2( +    )
4( +    )( +    ) > (2(1  ) + (1  ) + 2)( +     + 1)
contradiction
) QED:
(7)
To show: p1 > p3:
p1 > p3

F
2( +    )
( +     + 1) > 

F
2( +    ) >  + ( +    )
2 + 2(1  )        (1  ) > 0
2(1  ) > 0
(1  ) + (1  )[(2  )] > 0
true
) QED:
(8) To show: p1 >p3 > p2 > p4 i¤ F [1;
+ +1
2(+ ) ]:
From Lemmata 5, 6 and 7.
) QED:
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(9) To show: p1 > p3:
p1 > p3

F
  ( +     + 1)p
2( +    ) >

F
  p

p

>
( +     + 1)p
2( +    )
(2  )( +    )   > 0
 + 2(1  )  2   (1  ) > 0
(1  ) + (2  )(1  ) > 0
 >   
2   < 0
which is always true given that  2 [0; 1]
) QED:
(10) To show: + +1
2(+ ) <
1

:
 +     + 1
2( +    ) <
1

( +    ) +  < 2( +    )
2 + (1  ) +  < 2 + 2(1  )
(1  ) + 2(1  )  (1  ) > 0
 + (2  ) > 0
true
) QED:
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(11) To show: p3 > p4 i¤ F <
1

:
p3 > p4 ,


F
>

1   (

F
  1),

F
>
1
1   (

F
  1),
(1  ) 
F
>

F
  1,

F
(1     1) <  1,
1 > 

F
,

F
<
1

) QED:
From Lemmata 17 and 18 we get the following result.
Lemma 19 The Keep-Destroy subgame has two NE if:
1. For 
F
2 [1; + +1
2(+ ) ]
(a) p < p2 and p 2 [0; 1 p]
(b) p 2 [p2;p1] and p 2 [0; p1]
2. For 
F
> + +1
2(+ ) ; 8p and 8p.
Corollary 9 For 
F
2 [1; + +1
2(+ ) ] the unique NE is (Destroy, Destroy) if:
1. p 2 [p2;p1] and p 2 [p1; 1 p] or
2. p > p1:
From Lemma 19 we distinguish three cases:
1. 
F
2 [1; + +1
2(+ ) ] and p < p2
2. 
F
2 [1; + +1
2(+ ) ], p < p1 and p 2 [p2;p1]
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3. 
F
> + +1
2(+ )
We will analyze each of the three cases below.
Case 1 
F
2 [1; + +1
2(+ ) ] and p < p2
Given that 
F
2 [1; + +1
2(+ ) ], then from Lemma 18(8) p3 > p2 > p4.
Given that p3 > p2, from Lemma 18(1) p3  0. Moreover, if p < p4
then p3 > 1   p so that for all p (Keep, Keep) Pareto dominates (Destroy,
Destroy). If on the other hand p 2 [p4;p2] then from 18(3) p3  1   p
and thus for p < p3 (Keep, Keep) Pareto dominates (Destroy, Destroy),
while for p  p3 (Destroy, Destroy) Pareto dominates (Keep, Keep). These
results are summarized in the following lemma.
Lemma 20 For 
F
2 [1; + +1
2(+ ) ] and p < p2 the Pareto dominant NE of the
Keep-Destroy subgame is:
1. (Keep, Keep) if:
(a) p < p4(< p2) and 8p 2 [0; 1 p]
(b) p 2 [p4;p2] and p < p3
2. (Destroy, Destroy) if p 2 [p4;p2] and p  p3.
Case 2 
F
2 [1; + +1
2(+ ) ], p  p1 and p 2 [p2;p1]
From Lemma 18(8) we know that p1 > p3 > p2 > p4: Hence, p3 2
[p2;p1]. Given that p4 < p2 for all p 2 [p2;p1], p3  1 p. Then, for
p 2 [p2;p3], p3 2 [0; p1], while for p 2 (p3;p1], p3 < 0. Hence, for p 2
[p2;p3] if p < p3 (Keep, Keep) Pareto dominates (Destroy, Destroy),
while for p 2 [p3; p1] (Destroy, Destroy) Pareto dominates (Keep, Keep).
On the other hand, if p 2 (p3;p1] then for all p  p1 (Destroy, Destroy)
Pareto dominates (Keep, Keep).
From the above analysis and from Corollary 9 we get the following result.
Lemma 21 For 
F
2 [1; + +1
2(+ ) ], p < p1 and p 2 [p2;p1] the Pareto domi-
nant NE of the Keep-Destroy subgame is:
1. (Keep, Keep) if p 2 [p2;p3] and p < p3
2. (Destroy, Destroy) if:
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(a) p 2 [p2;p3] and p 2 [p3; p1]
(b) p 2 [p2;p1] and p > p1
(c) p 2 (p3;p1] and p  p1
(d) p > p1
Conjoining Lemmata 20 and 21 we obtain the following lemma.
Lemma 22 For 
F
2 [1; + +1
2(+ ) ] the Pareto dominant NE of the Keep-Destroy
subgame is:
1. (Keep, Keep) if:
(a) p < p4 and 8p 2 [0; 1 p]
(b) p 2 [p2;p3] and p < p3
2. (Destroy, Destroy) if:
(a) p 2 [p4;p3] and p  p3
(b) p > p3 and 8p 2 [0; 1 p]
Case 3 
F
> + +1
2(+ ) .
In that case we know from Lemma 19 that there are two NE for all p 2 [0; 1 p]
and for all p 2 [0; 1). From Lemmata 18(2), 18(4), 18(9) and 18(10) for 
F
2
[ + +1
2(+ ) ;
1

], p4 < p3 < 1. Hence, if p < p4, then p3 > 1   p and thus
(Keep, Keep) Pareto dominates (Destroy, Destroy). If p 2 [p4;p3]
then for p < p3 (Keep, Keep) Pareto dominates (Destroy, Destroy), while
for p  p3 (Destroy, Destroy) Pareto dominates (Keep, Keep). Moreover,
for all p > p3, p3 < 0 so that (Destroy, Destroy) Pareto dominates (Keep,
Keep). If on the other hand 
F
> 1

then both we know from Lemma 18(2)and
18(4) that both p3  1 and p4 > 1, implying that p3  0 and p3 > 1   p.
In that case for all p and for all p (Keep, Keep) Pareto dominates (Destroy,
Destroy).
We can summarize the above results into the following lemma.
Lemma 23 For 
F
> + +1
2(+ ) the Pareto dominant NE of the Keep-Destroy sub-
game is:
1. (Keep, Keep)
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(a) For 
F
2 [ + +1
2(+ ) ;
1

]
i. p < p4 and 8p 2 [0; 1 p]
ii. p 2 [p4;p3] and p < p3
(b) For 
F
> 1

2. (Destroy, Destroy)
(a) For 
F
2 [ + +1
2(+ ) ;
1

]
i. p 2 [p4;p3] and p  p3
ii. p > p3 and 8p 2 [0; 1 p]
From Lemmata 22 and 23 we reach the following proposition.
Proposition 1 For given policy and other parameters (p, p, F; , ) the Pareto
dominant SPE of the baseline model without LP is:
1. (Keep, Keep) i¤:
(a) 
F
2 [1; 1

] and
i. p 2 [0;p4] and p 2 [0; 1 p] or
ii. p 2 [p4;p3] and p 2 [0; p3) or
(b) 
F
> 1

, p 2 [0; 1) and p 2 [0; 1 p]
2. (Destroy, Destroy) i¤ 
F
2 [1; 1

] and
(a) p 2 [p4;p3] and p 2 [p3; 1 p] or
(b) p 2 (p3; 1) and p 2 [0; 1 p]
where p3  F   p , p3   F and p4  1  ( F   1).
Appendix B - Proofs for Section 4
Proof of Lemma 6
Lemma 24 1. For  
F
> 1 the revelation subgame has two NE.
2. For  
F
 1 and p+p   
F
the revelation subgame has also two NE.
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Corollary 10 For  
F
2 [1
2
; 1] and p + p >  
F
the revelation subgame has one
NE (Keep and Report, Keep and Report).
As discussed before in the case where we have two NE we apply the Pareto
dominance criterion. It is easy to show that VKR > VKNR i¤ p+p > 12 .
Lemma 25 (Keep and Report, Keep and Report) Pareto dominates (Keep
and Not Report, Keep and Not Report) in the revelation subgame if
p+p > 1
2
.
Therefore, from Lemmata 24 and 25 we obtain the following result:
Lemma 26 1. For  
F
2 [1
2
; 1]
(a) (Keep and Report, Keep and Report) Pareto dominates (Keep
and Not Report, Keep and Not Report) i¤ 1
2
< p+p   
F
(b) (Keep and Not Report, Keep and Not Report) Pareto domi-
nates (Keep and Report, Keep and Report) i¤ p+p  1
2
2. For  
F
> 1
(a) (Keep and Report, Keep and Report) Pareto dominates (Keep
and Not Report, Keep and Not Report) i¤ p+p > 1
2
(b) (Keep and Not Report, Keep and Not Report) Pareto domi-
nates (Keep and Report, Keep and Report) i¤ p+p  1
2
Conation of Corollary 10 and Lemma 26 above boils down to the following
lemma.
Lemma 27 The Pareto dominant NE of the Revelation subgame is:
1. (Keep and Not Report, Keep and Not Report) i¤ p+p  1
2
;
2. (Keep and Report, Keep and Report) i¤ p+p > 1
2
:
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Proof of Lemma 24
Lemma 28 1. p4 <  F
2. p4 < 0 i¤ F >
1
2
3. p4 < 12  p i¤ p < p5, where p5 = 1  F   2(1 )
4. p5 > 1 i¤ F >
2 
2
Proof of Lemma 28
(1) To show: p4 <  F :
p4 < 

F
F   2M
2(1  )F < 

F
 >
1  2 
F
2(1  ) 
F
 1
Notice that:
1 > 0
1  2 
F
2(1  ) 
F
> 0

F
<
1
2
contradiction since

F
 1
) Given that 1 < 0 it is always true that p4 <  F .
(2) To show: p4 < 0 i¤ F >
1
2
:
p4 < 0()
F   2M
2(1  )F < 0()

F
>
1
2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) QED:
(3) To show: p4 < 12  p i¤p < p5, where p5 = 1  F   2(1 ) :
p4 <
1
2
 p()
p <

1  

F
  
2(1  )  p5
) QED:
(4) To show: p5 > 1 i¤ F >
2 
2
:
p5 > 1()

1  

F
  
2(1  ) > 1()

F
>
2  
2
) QED:
Consider rst Lemma 9(1), that is,  
F
< 1   p so that the Keep-Destroy
subgame has two NE for p 2 [1
2
 p;  
F
]: Then, given Lemmata 10 and 28 above
we can now proceed to the analysis to nd the NE at the Keep-Destroy subgame.
To begin with suppose that  < 1
2
. Then, 1 < 1
2
< 2 
2
. From Lemma 28(2) if

F
> 1
2
; p4 < 0 implying that (Keep and Report, Keep and Report) Pareto
dominates (Destroy, Destroy) for all p 2 [maxf0; 1
2
 pg;  
F
]. If however 
F
<
1
2
then from Lemma 28(3) p4 2 [0; 12  p] if p < p5. Therefore, if F 2 [1; 12 ]
andp < p5 then (Keep and Report, Keep and Report) Pareto dominates
(Destroy, Destroy) for all p 2 [1
2
 p;  
F
]. If on the other hand p > p5
then for all p 2 [maxf0; 1
2
  pg; p4] (Destroy, Destroy) Pareto dominates
(Keep and Report, Keep and Report), whereas for all p 2 (p4;  F ] (Keep
and Report, Keep and Report) Pareto dominates (Destroy, Destroy).
Suppose now that  2 [1
2
; 2
3
]. Then 2 
2
> 1 > 1
2
. From Lemma 28(2) if

F
2 [1; 2 
2
] then p4 < 0 so that (Keep and Report, Keep and Report)
Pareto dominates (Destroy, Destroy) for all p 2 [1
2
  p;  
F
]. Moreover, if

F
> 2 
2
then again p4 < 0 so that (Keep and Report, Keep and Report)
Pareto dominates (Destroy, Destroy) for all p 2 [maxf0; 1
2
 pg;  
F
].
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Finally, suppose that  > 2
3
. Then 1 > 2 
2
> 1
2
. From Lemma 28(2) for all

F
 1; p4 < 0 implying that (Keep and Report, Keep and Report) Pareto
dominates (Destroy, Destroy) for all p 2 [maxf0; 1
2
 pg;  
F
].
Consider now Lemma 9(2), that is  
F
> 1 so that for all p 2 [1
2
 p; 1 p]
there are two NE. In that case we have to check whether p4 is greater or lower
than 1 p.
Lemma 29 1. p4 < 1 p i¤ p < p6; where p6 = 1 22(1 ) + 1  F
2. p6 > 1 i¤ F >
1

3. p6 > p5
Proof of Lemma 29
(1) To show: p4 < 1 p i¤p < p6 where p6 = 1 22(1 ) + 1  F :
p4 < 1 p,
F   2M
2(1  )F < 1 p,
p <
1  2
2(1  ) +

1  

F
 p6
) QED:
(2) To show: p6 > 1 i¤ F >
1

:
p6 > 1,
1  2
2(1  ) +

1  

F
> 1,

F
>
1

) p6 > 1 if F >
1

:
(3) To show: p6 > p5:
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p6 > p5
1  2
2(1  ) +

1  

F
>

1  

F
  
2(1  )
1  2
2(1  ) >  

2(1  )
1  2 + 
2(1  )
1
2
> 0
) QED:
Taking into consideration Lemma 29 above we can nd the Pareto dominant
NE of the Keep-Destroy subgame for di¤erent combinations of parametersvalues.
To begin with suppose that  < 1
2
. Then, 1 < 1
2
< 2 
2
< 1

: In that case, if

F
> 1
2
then p4 < 0 implying that (Keep and Report, Keep and Report)
Pareto dominates (Destroy, Destroy) for all p 2 [maxf0; 1
2
 pg; 1 p]. If
on the other hand, 
F
2 [1; 1
2
] then we can distinguish the following three cases:
1. From Lemma 28(3) if p < p5 then p4 < 12  p so that for all p 2 [12  
p; 1  p] (Keep and Report, Keep and Report) Pareto dominates
(Destroy, Destroy).
2. From Lemmata 28(3), 29(1) and 29(3) if p 2 [p5;p6] then p4 > 12  p
so that for p 2 [0; p4] (Destroy, Destroy) Pareto dominates (Keep and
Report, Keep and Report), while for p 2 (p4; 1   p] (Keep and
Report, Keep and Report) Pareto dominates (Destroy, Destroy).
3. From Lemma 29(1) ifp > p6 then p4 > 1 p so that for all p 2 [0; 1 p]
(Destroy, Destroy) Pareto dominates (Keep and Report, Keep and
Report).
Suppose now that  2 [1
2
; 2
3
]. Then, 1
2
< 1 < 2 
2
< 1

: From Lemma 28(2) for
all 
F
 1 then p4 < 0 so that (Keep and Report, Keep and Report) Pareto
dominates (Destroy, Destroy) for all p 2 [maxf0; 1
2
 pg; 1 p]:
Finally, if  > 2
3
then 1
2
< 2 
2
< 1 < 1

: From 28(2) then for all 
F
 1, p4 <
0 implying that (Keep and Report, Keep and Report) Pareto dominates
(Destroy, Destroy) for all p 2 (maxf0; 1
2
 pg; 1 p]:
We can now summarize the above results in the lemma below.
45
Lemma 30 The Pareto dominant NE of the Keep-Destroy subgame for
p+p > 1
2
and  
F
 1 is:
1. (Keep and Report, Keep and Report) i¤:
(a)  < 1
2
, 
F
> 1
2
and p 2 [maxf0; 1
2
 pg; 1 p];
(b)  < 1
2
, 
F
2 [1; 1
2
]; p < p5 and p 2 [12  p; 1 p];
(c)  < 1
2
, 
F
2 [1; 1
2
], p > p5 and p 2 [p4; 1 p];
(d)  > 1
2
, 
F
 1 and p 2 [maxf0; 1
2
 pg; 1 p]:
2. (Destroy, Destroy) i¤  < 1
2
, 
F
2 [1; 1
2
], p > p5 and p 2 [maxf0; 12 
pg; p4].
Lemma 31 The Pareto dominant NE of the Keep-Destroy subgame for
p > 1
2
 p and  
F
> 1 is:
1. (Keep and Report, Keep and Report) i¤:
(a)  < 1
2
, 
F
> 1
2
and p 2 [maxf0; 1
2
 pg; 1 p];
(b)  < 1
2
, 
F
2 [1; 1
2
], p < p5 and p 2 (12  p; 1 p];
(c)  < 1
2
, 
F
2 [1; 1
2
], p 2 [p5;p6] and p 2 (p4; 1 p];
(d)  > 1
2
, 
F
 1 and p 2 [maxf0; 1
2
 pg; 1 p]:
2. (Destroy, Destroy) i¤:
(a)  < 1
2
and 
F
2 [1; 1
2
] andp 2 [p5;p6] and p 2 [maxf0; 12 pg; p4];
(b)  < 1
2
and 
F
2 [1; 1
2
] p > p6 and p 2 [0; 1 p]:
From Lemmata 30 and 31 we get the following Lemma.
Lemma 32 The Pareto dominant SPE of the model with LP for p+p > 1
2
is:
1. (Keep and Report, Keep and Report) if:
(a)  < 1
2
and
i. 
F
2 [1; 1
2
], p < p5 and p 2 [12  p; 1 p]
ii. 
F
2 [1; 1
2
], p 2 [p5;p6] and p 2 (p4; 1 p]
46
iii. 
F
> 1
2
and p 2 [maxf0; 1
2
 pg; 1 p]
(b)  > 1
2
, 
F
 1 and p 2 [maxf0; 1
2
 pg; 1 p]:
2. (Destroy, Destroy) if  < 1
2
, 
F
2 [1; 1
2
] and
(a) p 2 [p5;p6] and p 2 [maxf0; 12  pg; p4]
(b) p > p6 and p 2 [0; 1 p].
Proof of Lemma 15
Lemma 33 1. p5  0 i¤ p  p7, where p7 = F 2(+ )+ +1
2. p7  1 i¤ F 2 [1; + +12(+ ) ]
3. + +1
2(+ ) >
1
2
4. p5 +p < 12 i¤ p > p8, where p8 =
(2 
F
 1)(+ )
1 (+ )
5. p8 > 1
6. p8 > p7
Proof of Lemma 33
(1) To show: p5 > 0 i¤p < p7, where p7 = F
2(+ )
+ +1 :
p5 > 0,

F
  ( +     + 1)p
2( +    ) > 0,
p <

F
2( +    )
 +     + 1  p7
) QED:
(2) To show: p7 < 1 i¤ F 2 [1; + +12(+ ) ].
p7 < 1,

F
2( +    )
 +     + 1 < 1,

F
<
 +     + 1
2( +    )
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) QED:
(3) To show: + +1
2(+ ) >
1
2
:
 +     + 1
2( +    ) >
1
2
 <
2
(1  )2
Given that  2 [1
2
; 1]; lim
! 1
2
2
(1 )2 = 1 and lim!1
2
(1 )2 = 1. Thus, given that
 2 [0; 1],  < 2
(1 )2 : Another way to see this is the following. Observe that
+ +1
+  > 1 and that max
2[ 1
2
;1]
1
2
= 1.
) QED:
(4) To show: p5 +p < 12 i¤p > p8, where p8 =
(2 
F
 1)(+ )
p81 (+ ) :
p5 +p <
1
2
,

F
  ( +     + 1)p
2( +    ) + p <
1
2
,
p >
(2 
F
  1)( +    )
1  ( +    )  p8
) QED:
(5) To show: p8 > 1:
(2 
F
  1)( +    )
1  ( +    ) > 1
(2

F
  1)( +    ) > 1  ( +    )

F
>
1  ( +    ) + ( +    )
2( +    )

F
>
1
2( +    )
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12( +    ) < 1
1 < 2( +    )
 +     > 1
2
true given that   1
2
) p8 > 1:
(6) To show: p7 > p8:
p7 > p8

F
2( +    )
 +     + 1 >
(2 
F
  1)( +    )
1  ( +    )

F
<
1 +  +    
4( +    )
Notice however that given that we are in the area where 
F
> 1
2
for this to hold
it must be the case that:
1 +  +    
4( +    ) >
1
2
(1  ) + (1  )(2  ) < 0
This, however, implies that 
F
< 1++ 
4(+ ) <
1
2
which is a contradiction.
) QED:
Notice that Lemma 33(5) imply that p5 > 12  p.
Corollary 11 p5 > 12  p.
From Lemma 33(1) p5 > 0 8p i¤ F > + +12(+ ) , while p5 > 0 for all p  p7
i¤ 
F
2 [1; + +1
2(+ ) ]. Therefore, for

F
2 [1; + +1
2(+ ) ] and p < p7 and for all
p 2 [0; 1
2
  p] (Keep and Not Report, Keep and Not Report) is a NE
of the Keep-Destroy subgame. If however 
F
2 [1; + +1
2(+ ) ] then from Lemmata
33(1) and 33(2) and p > p7 then p5 < 0. In the latter case (Keep Not
Report, Keep Not Report) is not a NE. On the other hand, from Lemmata
33(1), 33(2), 33(4) and 33(5) if 
F
> + +1
2(+ ) then both p8 > 1 and p7 > 1, so
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that for all p 2 [0; 1
2
 p] (Keep and Not Report, Keep and Not Report)
form a NE of the Keep-Destroy subgame.
Lemma 34 The Pareto dominant NE of the Keep-Destroy subgame for p < 1
2
 
p is:
1. 
F
2 [1; + +1
2(+ ) ] and p  p7 and p 2 [0; 12  p]
2. 
F
> + +1
2(+ ) and p 2 [0; 12  p]
Corollary 12 If 
F
2 [1; + +1
2(+ ) ] and p > p7 the unique NE of the Keep-
Destroy subgame for p  1
2
 p is (Destroy, Destroy).
Lemma 35 1. p3  0 i¤ p  p3, where p3   F :
2. p3 > 1 i¤ F >
1

3. p3  12  p i¤ p  p5, where p5  1  ( F   12)
4. p5 > 1 i¤ F >
2 
2
(from Lemma 28(4))
5. p5 > p3 i¤ F >
1
2
6. 1

> + +1
2(+ )
7. 2 
2
> + +1
2(+ )
8. 2 
2
< 1

9. 1
2
> + +1
2(+ ) if  < 0:414 or if  2 [0:414; 0:5] and  > 
2
(1 )2
Proof of Lemma 35
(1) To show: p3 > 0 if p < p3, where p3 =  F :
p3 > 0,

F
  p

> 0,
p < 

F
 p3
) QED:
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(2) To show: 1

> + +1
2(+ ) :
Let x   +    : Notice that x < 1. Then,
1

>
x+ 1
2x
2x > x+ x
x(2  ) > 
1

>
 +     + 1
2( +    )
(2 + (1  ))(1  ) > 0
Given that x >  it is the case also that x(2  ) > :
) QED:
(3) To show: p3 < 12  p if p > p5, where p5 = 1  ( F   12):
p3 <
1
2
 p,
p >

1   (

F
  1
2
)  p5
) QED:
(4) To show: p5 > 1 if F >
2 
2
:
p5 > 1,

1   (

F
  1
2
) > 1,

F
>
2  
2
) QED:
(5) To show: p3 > 1 if F >
1

:
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p3 > 1,


F
> 1,

F
>
1

) QED:
(6) To show: 2 
2
> + +1
2(+ ) :
By contradiction. Suppose that 2 
2
< + +1
2(+ ) . Then:
2  
2
<
 +     + 1
2( +    )
 <
(2   1)
22   4 + 2
Now, observe that (2 1)
22 4+2 <
1
2
:
(2   1)
22   4 + 2 <
1
2
2 +  < 2
always true
This implies that  < (2 1)
22 4+2 <
1
2
which is a contradiction, given
assumption 3.
) QED:
(7) To show: 2 
2
< 1

:
2  
2
<
1

 > 0
) QED:
(8) To show: p5 > p3 i¤ F >
1
2
:
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p5 > p3 ,

1   (

F
  1
2
) > 

F
,

F
>
1
2
) QED:
(9) To show: 1
2
> + +1
2(+ ) if  < 0; 414 or if  2 [0:414; 0; 5] and  > 
2
(1 )2 :
Let x   +    : Then:
1
2
>
 +     + 1
2( +    )
x > x+ 
x >

1  
Now notice that 
1  > 1 if  >
1
2
: However, this leads to a contradiction since
x < 1: Therefore. if  > 1
2
then 1
2
< + +1
2(+ ) .
Now suppose that  < 1
2
: In this case,
1
2
>
 +     + 1
2( +    )
 >
2
(1  )2
Notice that 
2
(1 )2 <
1
2
if  < 0; 414: Therefore, for  < 0; 414 1
2
> + +1
2(+ ) .
Moreover, for  2 [0:414; 0; 5] and  > 2
(1 )2 : Conversely, if  2 [0:414; 0; 5] and
 < 
2
(1 )2 then
1
2
< + +1
2(+ ) :
) QED:
Case 1 
F
2 [1; + +1
2(+ ) ] so that p7 < 1
1. From Lemmata 35(8) and 35(9) if  < 0:414 or  2 [0:414; 0:5] and  > 2
(1 )2
then 1

> 2 
2
> 1
2
> + +1
2(+ ) > 1. Therefore, given that

F
2 [1; + +1
2(+ ) ]
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and taking into account Lemmata 35(1), 35(2), 35(3), 35(4) and 35(5) we
may distinguish three subcases:
(a) if p < p5 then p3  0 and p3 > 12   p. Hence (Keep and
not Report, Keep and not Report) Pareto dominates (Destroy,
Destroy) for all p 2 [0; 1
2
 p].
(b) if p 2 [p5;p3] then p3  0 and p3  12   p. Hence for p 2
[0; p3) (Keep and not Report, Keep and not Report) Pareto
dominates (Destroy, Destroy), while for p 2 [p3; 12 p] (Destroy,
Destroy) Pareto dominates (Keep and not Report, Keep and
not Report).
(c) if p 2 [p3,12 ] then p3 < 0 and p3  12   p. Hence (Destroy,
Destroy) Pareto dominates (Keep and not Report, Keep and
not Report) for all p 2 [0; 1
2
 p]. Notice that we restrict p < 1
2
so that the set [0; 1
2
 p] is non-empty.
2. From Lemmata 35(7), 35(8) and 35(9) if  2 [0:414; 0:5] and  < 2
(1 )2 then
1

> 2 
2
> + +1
2(+ ) >
1
2
> 1.
(a) If 
F
2 [1; 1
2
] then from Lemma 35(5) p3 > p5. Taking into consid-
eration Lemmata 35(1), 35(2), 35(3) and 35(4) we may distinguish the
following three cases:
i. if p < p5 then p3  0 and p3 > 12 p. Hence (Keep and not
Report, Keep and not Report) Pareto dominates (Destroy,
Destroy) for all p 2 [0; 1
2
 p].
ii. if p 2 [p5;p3] then p3  0 and p3  12   p. Hence for
p 2 [0; p3) (Keep and not Report, Keep and not Report)
Pareto dominates (Destroy, Destroy), while for p 2 [p3; 12  
p] (Destroy, Destroy) Pareto dominates (Keep and not
Report, Keep and not Report).
iii. if p 2 [p3; 12 ] then p3 < 0 and p3  12  p. Hence (Destroy,
Destroy) Pareto dominates (Keep and not Report, Keep
and not Report) for all p 2 [0; 1
2
 p].
(b) If 
F
2 [ 1
2
; + +1
2(+ ) ] then from Lemma 35(5) p5 > p3 >
1
2
. Taking
into consideration Lemmata 35(1), 35(2), 35(3) and 35(4) if p < 1
2
then p3  0 and p3 > 12 p. Hence, (Keep and not Report, Keep
and not Report) Pareto dominates (Destroy, Destroy).
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3. From Lemmata 35(7), 35(8) if  2 [1
2
; 2
3
] then 1

> 2 
2
> + +1
2(+ ) >
1 > 1
2
. By taking into consideration Lemmata 35(2), 35(4) and 35(5) if

F
2 [1; + +1
2(+ ) ] then p5 > p3 >
1
2
. By Lemmata 35(1) and 35(3) if
p < 1
2
then p3  0 and p3 > 12   p. Hence for p < 12 (Keep and
not Report, Keep and not Report) Pareto dominates (Destroy,
Destroy) for all p 2 [0; 1
2
 p].
4. From Lemmata 35(7), 35(8) if  > 2
3
then 1

> + +1
2(+ ) > 1 >
2 
2
> 1
2
. By
taking into account Lemmata 35(2), 35(4) and 35(5) 1 > p5 > p3 > 12 .
Hence, from Lemmata 35(1) and 35(3) ifp < 1
2
then p3  0 and p3 > 12 p.
Therefore, forp < 1
2
(Keep and not Report, Keep and not Report)
Pareto dominates (Destroy, Destroy) for all p 2 [0; 1
2
 p].
Case 2 
F
> + +1
2(+ ) so that p7 > 1
Consider the second case now where p7 > 1 so that for all p and p  12 p
we have two NE.
1. From Lemmata 35(7), 35(8) and 35(9) if  < 0:414 or  2 [0:414; 0:5] and
 > 
2
(1 )2 then
1

> 2 
2
> 1
2
> + +1
2(+ ) > 1. Therefore, given that

F
> + +1
2(+ ) and taking into account Lemmata 35(1), 35(2), 35(3), 35(4)
and 35(5) we may then distinguish four cases:
(a) if 
F
> 1

then both p5 > p3 > 1 implying that p3  0 and p3 >
1
2
  p. Therefore for p < 1
2
(Keep and not Report, Keep
and not Report) Pareto dominates (Destroy, Destroy) for all
p 2 [0; 1
2
 p].
(b) if 
F
2 [2 
2
; 1

] then p5 > 1 > p3 > 12 . Therefore, for p <
1
2
then
p3  0 and p3 > 12  p and hence (Keep and not Report, Keep
and not Report) Pareto dominates (Destroy, Destroy) for all
p 2 [0; 1
2
 p].
(c) if 
F
2 [ 1
2
; 2 
2
] then 1 > p5 > p3 > 12 . Therefore, for p <
1
2
then
p3  0 and p3 > 12  p and hence (Keep and not Report, Keep
and not Report) Pareto dominates (Destroy, Destroy) for all
p 2 [0; 1
2
 p].
(d) 
F
2 [ + +1
2(+ ) ;
1
2
] then 1
2
> p3 > p5. Therefore:
i. if p < p5, then p3 > 0 and p3 > 12   p and hence (Keep
and not Report, Keep and not Report) Pareto dominates
(Destroy, Destroy).
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ii. if p 2 [p5;p3] then p3  0 and p3  12   p and hence for
p < p3 (Keep and not Report, Keep and not Report)
Pareto dominates (Destroy, Destroy), while for p 2 [p3; 12  
p] (Destroy, Destroy) Pareto dominates (Keep and not
Report, Keep and not Report).
iii. if p > (p3; 12 ] then p3 < 0 and hence (Destroy, Destroy)
Pareto dominates (Keep and not Report, Keep and not Re-
port) for all p 2 [0; 1
2
 p].
2. From Lemmata 35(7), 35(8) and 35(9) if  2 [0; 414; 0; 5] and  < 2
(1 )2 then
1

> 2 
2
> + +1
2(+ ) >
1
2
> 1. By taking into account Lemmata 35(1),
35(2), 35(3), 35(4) and 35(5) we may then distinguish the following three
cases:
(a) if 
F
> 1

then both p5 > p3 > 12 implying that for all p <
1
2
p3 > 0 and p3 > 12  p. Therefore (Keep and not Report, Keep
and not Report) Pareto dominates (Destroy, Destroy) for all
p 2 [0; 1
2
 p].
(b) if 
F
2 [2 
2
; 1

] then p5 > 1 > p3 > 12 . Therefore, for p <
1
2
then
p3  0 and p3 > 12  p and hence (Keep and not Report, Keep
and not Report) Pareto dominates (Destroy, Destroy) for all
p 2 [0; 1
2
 p].
(c) if 
F
2 [ + +1
2(+ ) ;
2 
2
] then 1 > p5 > p3 > 12 . Therefore, for p <
1
2
then p3  0 and p3 > 12   p and hence (Keep and not Report,
Keep and not Report) Pareto dominates (Destroy, Destroy)
for all p 2 [0; 1
2
 p].
3. From Lemmata 35(7) and 35(8) if  2 [1
2
; 2
3
] then 1

> 2 
2
> + +1
2(+ ) >
1 > 1
2
. By taking into consideration Lemmata 35(1), 35(2), 35(3), 35(4)
and 35(5) we may then distinguish the following three cases:
(a) if 
F
> 1

then both p5 > p3 > 1 implying that for all p < 12 , p3 > 0
and p3 > 12  p. Therefore, for all p < 12 (Keep and not Report,
Keep and not Report) Pareto dominates (Destroy, Destroy)
for all p 2 [0; 1
2
 p].
(b) if 
F
2 [2 
2
; 1

] then p5 > 1 > p3 > 12 . Therefore, for p <
1
2
then
p3  0 and p3 > 12  p and hence (Keep and not Report, Keep
and not Report) Pareto dominates (Destroy, Destroy) for all
p 2 [0; 1
2
 p].
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(c) if 
F
2 [ + +1
2(+ ) ;
2 
2
] then 1 > p5 > p3 > 12 . Therefore, for p <
1
2
then p3  0 and p3 > 12   p and hence (Keep and not Report,
Keep and not Report) Pareto dominates (Destroy, Destroy)
for all p 2 [0; 1
2
 p].
4. From Lemmata Lemmata 35(7) and 35(8) if  > 2
3
then 1

> + +1
2(+ ) > 1 >
2 
2
> 1
2
. By taking into consideration Lemmata 35(1), 35(2), 35(3), 35(4)
and 35(5) we may then distinguish the following two cases:
(a) 
F
> 1

then both p5 > p3 > 12 implying that for all p <
1
2
,
p3  0 and p3 > 12  p. Therefore (Keep and not Report, Keep
and not Report) Pareto dominates (Destroy, Destroy) for all
p 2 [0; 1
2
 p].
(b) 
F
2 [1; + +1
2(+ ) ] then p5 > 1 > p3 >
1
2
. Therefore, for p < 1
2
then
p3  0 and p3 > 12  p and hence (Keep and not Report, Keep
and not Report) Pareto dominates (Destroy, Destroy) for all
p 2 [0; 1
2
 p].
We can now summarize the results of the above analysis to the following lemma.
Lemma 36 The SPE of the game is (Keep and Not Report, Keep and Not
Report) if :
1.  < 0:414
(a) 
F
2 [ + +1
2(+ ) ;
1
2
] and p7 > 1 OR F 2 [1; + +12(+ ) ] and p7 < 1
i. p < p5 and p 2 [0; 12  p]
ii. p 2 [p5;p3] and p 2 [0; p3)
(b) 
F
2 [ 1
2
; 1

]; p < 1
2
(< p3 < 1 < p7) and p 2 [0; 12  p]
(c) 
F
> 1

; p < 1
2
< 1 < p7 and p 2 [0; 12  p]
2.  2 [0:414; 0:5]
(a)  < 
2
(1 )2
i. 
F
2 [1; 1
2
], p < p5(< 12 < p7 < 1) and p 2 [0; 12  p]
ii. 
F
2 [1; 1
2
], p 2 [p5;p3](< 12 < p7 < 1) and p 2 [0; p3)
iii. 
F
2 [ 1
2
; + +1
2(+ ) ], p <
1
2
(< p3 < p7 < 1) and p 2 [0; 12  p]
57
iv. 
F
2 [ 1
2
; 1

], p < 1
2
(< p3 < 1 < p7) and p 2 [0; 12  p]
v. 
F
> 1

, p < 1
2
and p 2 [0; 1
2
 p]
(b)  > 
2
(1 )2
i. 
F
2 [1; + +1
2(+ ) ], p < p5(< p7 < 1) and p 2 [0; 12  p]
ii. 
F
2 [1; + +1
2(+ ) ], p 2 [p5;p3](< 12 < p7 < 1) and p 2 [0; p3)
iii. 
F
2 [ 1
2
; 1

], p < 1
2
(< p3 < 1 < p7) and p 2 [0; 12  p]
iv. 
F
2 [ + +1
2(+ ) ;
1
2
], p < p5(< 1 < p7) and p 2 [0; 12  p]
v. 
F
2 [ + +1
2(+ ) ;
1
2
]; p 2 [p5;p3](< 12 < 1 < p7) and p 2
[0; p3)
vi. 
F
> 1

; p < 1
2
(< 1 < p7) and p 2 [0; 12  p]
3.  > 0:5
(a) 
F
2 [1; + +1
2(+ ) ]; p <
1
2
(< p3 < p7 < 1) and p 2 [0; 12  p]
(b) 
F
2 [ + +1
2(+ ) ;
1

]; p < 1
2
(< p3 < 1 < p7) and p 2 [0; 12  p]
(c) 
F
> 1

; 8p < 1
2
(< 1 < p7) and p 2 [0; 12  p]
Lemma 36(2(a)iii) and 36(2(a)iv) imply the following result.
Corollary 13 (Keep and not Report, Keep and Not Report) is the SPE
if  2 [0:414; 0:5],  < 2
(1 )2 ,

F
2 [ 1
2
; 1

], p < 1
2
and p 2 [0; 1
2
 p]:
From Lemma 36(2(b)i) and 36(2(b)iv) we can get the corollary below.
Corollary 14 (Keep and not Report, Keep and Not Report) is the SPE
if  2 [0:414; 0:5],  > 2
(1 )2 ;

F
2 [1; 1
2
], p < p5 and p 2 [0; 12  p]:
Lemma 36(2(b)ii) and 36(2(b)v) imply the following.
Corollary 15 (Keep and not Report, Keep and Not Report) is the SPE
if  2 [0:414; 0:5],  > 2
(1 )2 ;

F
2 [1; 1
2
], p 2 [p5;p3] and p 2 [0; p3):
Lemma 36(3a) and 36(3b) imply the following.
Corollary 16 (Keep and not Report, Keep and Not Report) is the SPE
if 
F
2 [1; 1

], p < 1
2
and p 2 [0; 1
2
 p]:
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From Lemma 36 and Corollaries 13, 14, 15 and 16 we get the following result,
which identies the parametersvalues for which (Keep and Not Report, Keep
and Not Report) is the Pareto dominant SPE for p  1
2
 p.
Similarly, by summarizing the results of our previous analysis we nd the re-
gions for the parametersvalues for which (Destroy, Destroy) form a Pareto
dominant SPE for p  1
2
 p.
Lemma 37 For p 2 [0; 1
2
  p] (Destroy, Destroy) is the Pareto dominant
SPE if:
1.  < 0:414
(a) 
F
2 [1; + +1
2(+ ) ], p 2 [p5;p3](< p7 < 1) and p 2 [p3; 12  p]
(b) 
F
2 [1; + +1
2(+ ) ], p 2 [p3; 12 ](< p7 < 1) and p 2 [0; 12  p]
(c) 
F
2 [ + +1
2(+ ) ;
1
2
]; p 2 [p3; 12 ](< 1 < p7) and p 2 [0; 12  p]
(d) 
F
2 [ + +1
2(+ ) ;
1
2
], [p5;p3](< 12 < 1 < p7) and p 2 [p3; 12  p]
2.  2 [0:414; 0:5]
(a)  < 
2
(1 )2
i. 
F
2 [1; 1
2
], p 2 [p5;p3](< p7 < 1) and p 2 [p3; 12  p]
ii. 
F
2 [ + +1
2(+ ) ;
1
2
]; p 2 [p3; 12 ](< 1 < p7) and p 2 [0; 12  p]
(b)  > 
2
(1 )2
i. 
F
2 [1; + +1
2(+ ) ], p 2 [p5;p3](< p7 < 1) and p 2 [p3; 12 p]
ii. 
F
2 [1; + +1
2(+ ) ], p 2 [p3; 12 ](< p7 < 1) and p 2 [0; 12  p]
iii. 
F
2 [ + +1
2(+ ) ;
1
2
]; p 2 [p3; 12 ](< 1 < p7) and p 2 [0; 12  p]
iv. 
F
2 [ + +1
2(+ ) ;
1
2
], [p5;p3](< 12 < 1 < p7) and p 2 [p3; 12 p]
Taking into consideration Corollary 12 we get the following result, which iden-
ties the parametersvalues for which (Destroy, Destroy) is the Pareto dom-
inant SPE for p 2 [0; 1
2
 p].
From Lemmata 36, 37 and 32 we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 2 For given policy and other parameters (p, p, F; , ) the Pareto
dominant SPE of the extended game with LP is:
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1. (Destroy, Destroy) i¤  < 1
2
, 
F
2 [1; 1
2
] and
(a) p 2 [p5;p3] and p 2 [p3; 12  p] or
(b) [p3; 12) and p 2 [0; 12  p] or
(c) p 2 [p5;p6] and p 2 [maxf0; 12  pg; p4] or
(d) p > p6 and p 2 [0; 1 p]
2. (Keep and Not Report, Keep and Not Report) i¤:
(a)  < 1
2
and
i. 
F
2 [1; 1
2
]; p < p5 and p 2 [0; 12  p] or
ii. 
F
2 [1; 1
2
]; p 2 [p5;p3] and p 2 [0; p3) or
iii. 
F
> 1
2
; p < 1
2
and p 2 [0; 1
2
 p] or
(b)  > 1
2
; 
F
 1; p < 1
2
and p 2 [0; 1
2
 p]
3. (Keep and Report, Keep and Report) i¤:
(a)  < 1
2
and
i. 
F
2 [1; 1
2
], p < p5 and p 2 [12  p; 1 p] or
ii. 
F
2 [1; 1
2
], p 2 [p5;p6] and p 2 (p4; 1 p] or
iii. 
F
> 1
2
and p 2 [maxf0; 1
2
 pg; 1 p] or
(b)  > 1
2
, 
F
 1 and p 2 [maxf0; 1
2
 pg; 1 p]
where p3 = F   p , p4 = F 2M2(1 )F , p3 =  F , p5 = 1  F   2(1 ) and
p6 =
1 2
2(1 ) +

1 

F
.
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